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In Search of “The Russian Path”
Impact of the 2008 Crisis on Russia’s Economic Policy

Dasha Barannik
2009–2010 Penn Humanities Forum
Undergraduate Mellon Research Fellowship

INTRODUCTION

Between 2000 and 2008 Vladimir Putin presided over a dramatically changing Russia.
During his tenure as President, the country enjoyed its strongest economic position since the end
of Communism, characterized by booming average macroeconomic growth of 6.7 percent per
year, modest inflation, budget surpluses, the eradication of foreign debt obligations and the
accumulation of massive hard currency reserves (see Appendix A).1 Between 1999 and 2008
Russia ranked among the world‘s fastest growing economies, also recording the highest per
capita income in purchasing power parity terms ($16,000) among the promising BRIC countries
(Brazil, Russia, India, China).2 Social order and stability returned after the fallout from the 1998
financial crisis; unemployment levels fell, real disposable income and consumer spending rose,
and many were lifted out of poverty. In comparison to the fractious experiments with democracy
of the 1990s, the average Russian citizen viewed himself as safer, more secure, and living better
across a series of indicators under the leadership of Vladimir Putin.
Putin‘s rise also engendered the reemergence of autocratic rule and a gradual rollback of
democracy. Centralization of political power at the federal level, enlargement of government
resources, the marked absence of a true political opposition party, and an unprecedented
intrusion of the state into economic affairs – all of these indicators attest to the Kremlin‘s zealous
pursuit of control, which many commentators, both Western and Russian, believe cost Russia
dearly in spite of the tremendous economic revival. In terms of public safety, civil society,

1

Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, ―The Myth of the Authoritarian Model: How Putin's Crackdown
Holds Russia Back.‖ Foreign Affairs, January/February 2008.
2
Anders Aslund and Peter Kuchins, The Russia Balance Sheet. Peter G. Peterson Institute for International
Economic and the Center for Strategic International Studies. 2009. P 40
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health, corruption, and the security of property rights, Russians were worse off in 2008 than they
were a decade ago.3
The ideal of a strong and sovereign Russia permeated government rhetoric and policy
during this time. Wishing to chart his country‘s unique political, economic and social course
through history independent of dictates from foreign influences, Putin took an assertive stance on
the global stage. Clashes with the WTO and the IMF, a nationalist foreign policy, and other
seemingly anti-globalization instances, however, occurred just as Russia was becoming
increasingly integrated with the international economy. Between 1999 and 2008 the country‘s
exports grew 525 percent and imports rose almost 640 percent; in the same period, foreign
investment flows grew to $60 billion.4 Foreign direct investment constituted twelve percent of
gross domestic product (GDP) in 2008,5 reflecting overseas investors‘ substantial interest in
profiting from Russia‘s flourishing economy. By no means could one consider Russia to be a
full-fledged market economy in 2008: the existence of state monopolies combined with a corrupt
state apparatus and the lack of sufficient institutional underpinnings to support the enforcement
of private property rights left a huge array of market-sustaining reforms unachieved. Kremlin
plans for modernization produced in the last eight years met with skepticism on the part of
Russian citizens and Western observers, who doubted the credibility of the state‘s commitment
to facilitating economic competition via a strong rule of law and transparent policy environment.
Wholesale adoption of Western capitalism has not occurred in Russia; instead, between 2000 and
2008 foreign financial intermediation occurred within a state-dominated economic system.

3

Ibid
William Cooper, ―Russia‘s Economic Performance and Policies and Their Implications for the United States.‖
Congressional Research Service. Report for Congress, RL 34512.
5
Ibid
4
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Beginning with a severe decline in the Russian stock market in August 2008 and
compounded by plummeting oil prices, the global financial crisis has initiated severe economic
recession in Russia. As a result, myriad weaknesses in various aspects of its export-dependent
economy, money markets and financial sector have been laid bare; gross domestic product fell
9.5 percent in the first quarter of 2009,6 real incomes plunged 6.7 percent,7 and foreign exchange
reserves shrank by $131 billion in 2008.8 Initially adamant about Russia‘s strength and ability to
withstand adverse economic impacts seen as originating in Western nations, the Kremlin
reversed course in August 2009 when President Dmitry Medvedev admitted that misguided
government policies had exacerbated his country‘s problems: ―We cannot develop any longer
like this….the crisis has put us under such conditions that we will have to take decisions about
changing the structure of our economy,‖9 he acknowledged. This statement alone indicates a
substantial break with nearly a decade of Putin-led assertions insisting on Russia‘s independent
success in generating wealth in the global economy. The severity of the present downturn brings
questions pertaining to state interference in economic affairs and diversification of the resourcedependent economy to the forefront of public and scholarly discourse. Yet, as renowned Russia
scholar Dmitri Simes notes, ―in Russia, hard times normally produce hard lines;‖10 future liberal
reforms are by no means the expectation. In fact, the crisis may cause any burgeoning interest in
such policies on the part of the government to be replaced by hardening of state control in the
economic sphere.

6

―Russia and the Financial Crisis.‖ The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) Russia. June 15,
2009.
7
Ibid
8
Ibid
9
Stuart Williams, ―Russian economy hitting dead end.‖ The Associated Foreign Press. August 11, 2009.
10
Dmitri Simes, ―Uncertainty in Moscow.‖ The National Interest Online: Subjective Evaluation. December 12,
2008.
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Russia now unmistakably confronts the tradeoffs implied by the realities of
unprecedented interdependence with the global economy. The economic devastation the country
experienced in 1998 as a result of its first financial crisis followed several years of attempts at
market-oriented reform strategies and interaction with the global economy. Instead of
transforming the inefficient legacies of the Soviet economy into a modern competitive market,
this so-called ―neoliberal experiment‖11 resulted in narrowly focused policies that exposed
Russia to international capital volatility and led to a collapse of the ruble. Yet today Russian
policymakers face a vastly different political and economic situation than their counterparts who
were forced to devalue the ruble and default on foreign obligations a decade ago. Since 1999
heightened exposure to foreign capital flows has occurred concurrently with the Putin-led
channeling of windfall profits from commodities exports to a state-controlled network of
domestic enterprise comprising banks, holding companies, and industrial leaders. During the oil
boom of 2000-2008, this arrangement ensured economic and social stability, a hallmark of the
Putin regime, but hinged precariously on favorable externally determined commodities prices
and operated via a deficient and weak domestic mechanism. The implosion of the Western
financial system in 2008 stopped the capital flows that had sustained this system. The resultant
diminished financial capacity of the Russian state and indirect consequences for domestic
politics affect the viability and attractiveness of available policies for recovery and future
growth, elevating the urgency of determining how the Kremlin will attempt to balance
preservation of its strong influence on the Russian economy and society with increased
adherence to policies and conditions favorable to stability and security in internationally
integrated goods and capital markets.

11

Neil Robinson, ―The global economy, reform and crisis in Russia.‖ Review of International Political Economy 6:4
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The formulation of a response to the crisis reflects the shifting balance between
considerations of domestic policy goals and the constraints the powerful forces of globalization
potentially impose on the Kremlin if it wishes to reap the benefits of international markets. The
experience of the current crisis opens wider the door of opportunity to break Russia‘s historical
legacy of an authoritarian state maintaining a resource-dependent economy; it may force farreaching changes in the economy, society, and foreign policy. Furthermore, it offers a case study
of how developing countries respond to the ―trilemma‖12 confronting nation-states in the postglobal crisis world: what is the price of deeper international economic integration in terms of
foregone flexibility of the nation-state to prescribe policies driven by domestically-determined
needs? Conclusions about Russia‘s shifting priorities and options carry implications for
undemocratic regimes that rely on the global system for market-based financial intermediation,
as well as for the prospects for international cooperation and leadership in the evolving global
order. By tracing the interaction of external economic events and Russia‘s domestic economic
framework this thesis will characterize the changing considerations and constraints presently
faced by policymakers and the impact of such a shifting economic decision making climate on
domestic regime stability. The financial crisis has forced significant reconfigurations in
economic thinking within the Russian government, but the overall approach to economic
diversification, modernization and liberalization will likely remain largely unchanged if Putin
and those in his inner circle feel they retain a secure hold on political power.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Since August 2008, the adverse impact of the global credit crisis on the Russian economy
has precipitated a flurry of commentary, analysis and questions regarding the government policy
12

Dani Rodrik, One Economics, Many Recipes. Princeton University Press, Princeton. 2007.
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response and prospects for long-term structural economic reform. In several cases, this
scholarship has connected the current situation to broader political, economic and social issues
both internal and external to Russia, creating a substantial body of observation and perspectives
on which this thesis will draw.
Russia‘s increased interaction with global markets since encountering its first financial
crisis in 1998 has created different conditions under which future policy will take shape;
previous frameworks assessing factors influencing the sequence, timing and viability of
economic liberalization in Russia must be tailored to fit the particular environment created by the
recent global downturn. Theoretical perspectives on the opportunities and limitations inherent to
the contemporary globalized economy offer basic frameworks for understanding the Russian
manifestation of crisis and response.

Globalization theory
Theories of the impact of globalization, defined as increased international economic
integration, generally agree on the existence of a tradeoff between benefits to domestic economic
growth and limitations on government ability to pursue domestic policy goals that may be at
odds with what is favorable for international economic activity. Dani Rodrik refers to a
―trilemma‖13 confronting nation states, limiting them to the successful attainment of two out of
three policy goals: independent monetary policy in pursuit of low unemployment and inflation
levels, capital mobility, and a fixed exchange rate. Similarly, Thomas Friedman cites the
necessity for today‘s nation-state to don the ―golden straitjacket‖14 of privatizing enterprises,
balancing budgets, lowering tariffs, removing restrictions on foreign investment, and eliminating
13
14

Dani Rodrik, One Economics, Many Recipes.
Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree. New York, NY. Anchor Books, 1999. P 110.
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subsidies for state-owned firms if it wishes to attract international investors and profit from
globalization.15
If the paths to economic prosperity available to states in the contemporary global
economy are thus increasingly dictated by external actors, at least in some policy spheres, the
sovereignty of the state itself, and political power bases, may be at threat. Rodrik argues that the
weakened ability of national governments to sustain domestic social welfare arrangements in
light of externally motivated obligations could prove politically destabilizing. The scaling back
of Icelandic government expenditures on social welfare in order to repay external debt
obligations and stabilize the krona serves as contemporary evidence of this dynamic. Citizens
may increasingly criticize governments whose policies towards international markets they view
as inadequate in ensuring social stability, prosperity, or other traditional mandates bestowed on
the nation-state. Contrary to the suggestions of contemporary rhetoric, Garrett believes that
global markets impose weaker constraints on national policy choices than presumed due to the
―strengthened political incentives for governments to use the policy instruments of the state to
mitigate market dislocations by redistributing wealth and risk.‖16 Thus, the creation by
government of new agencies for the purpose of retraining workers or disbursing social security
funds itself supports the notion that the state retains capacity to effect change aimed at
counteracting the effects of globalization. Garrett argues that states have the tools to slow
international economic integration; the degree to which they are used in this regard is a reflection
of social and political factors.

15

Qtd in Barry Eichengreen, ―One Economy, Ready or Not: Thomas Friedman‘s Jaunt Through Globalization.‖
Foreign Affairs, May/June 1999.
16
Geoffrey Garrett, ―Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle?‖ International
Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, International Organization at Fifty: Exploration and Contestation in the Study of
World Politics (Autumn, 1998), pp. 787-824
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Integration with the global economy offers the potentially significant benefits to
economic growth rates, but forces countries to bear risks that, if not addressed via properly
tailored economic policy, may destabilize and bankrupt nations. Foreign direct investment and
capital inflows, two indicators of international economic integration, have been shown to
stimulate growth in developing countries such as Russia. Nevertheless, the lack of strong
domestic institutions and regulatory frameworks, particularly in the banking sector, allowed
waves of financial crisis to destabilize these regions in the 1990s.17 International institutions and
scholars advised developing country governments to increase economic cooperation with other
countries, modernize the domestic financial sector and encourage transparency, competition,
accountability, and protection of property rights; however, perceptions of globalization, political
and other factors influence the timing and content of such reforms, and ultimately, their success
in achieving lasting economic development. Specifically, governments in post-crisis emerging
economies must balance expenditures on social welfare and pursuit of structural reforms
increasing the state‘s propensity to profit in a globalized economy. Rogoff and others, in
discussing how to best create a suitable domestic political and economic milieu for harnessing
the benefits of global markets at minimal risk, suggest that insulation from the global economy
through capital controls may have been a more promising strategy than complete openness to
financial markets for economic growth post-2008.18 Only developing countries with ―stable
macroeconomic policies as well as sufficiently strong financial and other institutions, regulation
and governance…could benefit from being financially open;‖19 the divergent impact of the 2008
crisis on significantly ―open‖ and relatively ―closed‖ economies has prompted a reinvigorated

17

Ibid
M. Ayhan Kose, Eswar Prasad, Kenneth Rogoff and Shang-Jin Wei. ―Financial Globalization: A Reappraisal.‖
August 2006. IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan Journals, vol. 56(1), P 8-62
19
Ibid
18
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research agenda on the components of a stable and prosperous interaction with foreign
economies under increasing financial globalization. Scholars of Russian politics often cite the
early 1990s as a period when Russia, under the heavy-handed influence of the West,
unsuccessfully pursued the paradigm of globalization‘s positive promises.20 With this historical
background in mind, economic development strategy today must harmonize Russia‘s unique
values, traditions and resources with the norms and processes of the global environment.

Comparison with 1998 financial crisis
In recent Russian history, crisis preceded periods of substantial economic change in
1991-1993 and 1998-2002.21 Thus, in an attempt to describe the impact of the 2008 credit crunch
on Russia, scholars have examined what its differences in nature and context from the 1998
financial crisis may imply for the future. Whereas 1998 involved a national public sector and
currency crisis, excessive borrowing by the private sector due to major triple shocks—terms of
trade, capital outflows, and tight external borrowing – incited the crisis of 2008.22 As Bogetic
notes, global linkages in place by 2008 meant that the drastic deterioration of the foreign market
situation with respect to raw material prices and financial markets made a Russian economic
downturn inevitable.23 Most notably, the 2008 crisis has spread to the real sector of the economy
(i.e. the downturn is evident in wages and industrial production), adding broader uncertainty over
macroeconomic growth to problems in the financial sector. Consequently, academic literature
has broadly segmented potential government responses to the 2008 crisis into short-term
20

Paul Saunders, ―Why ‗Globalization‘ Didn‘t Rescue Russia.‖ Policy Review, Hoover Institution, Stanford
University. February & March 2001.
21
―Russia‘s Road Back.‖ Interview with Anders Aslund. Peterson Institute for International Economics. April 22,
2009.
22
Zeljko Bogetic, “Russia: Recent Economic Developments and Medium-Term Prospects.‖ March 31, 2008.
Moscow.
23
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recovery measures and longer-term structural reforms aimed at diversifying the economy and
furthering economic liberalization by reducing state control over economic activity.
It is important to note that a weak government ruled Russia in the post-1998 period.24
Some structural reforms were introduced during this time, but were eclipsed by the
reestablishment of state control over key sectors of the economy beginning in 2002.25 According
to Neil Robinson, between 1999 and 2003 the Russian state emphasized the use of energy
revenues as a source of patronage instead of strengthening state administrative capacity, a legal
basis for economic activity and the rule of law; as a result, the state could not stimulate
homegrown finance and growth, nor harness the ―transformative powers of global markets.‖26
Scholars agree that the Russian economic development policy depended on revenues from oil
and gas exports in the 2000s, encouraged by high commodity prices. This created vulnerability to
international downturns while limiting the scope for institutional and regulatory reforms that
could free the country from the structural legacy of communism. Today, the strength of the
―more sophisticated‖27 Russian state is strikingly higher and its reach decidedly broader,
although it is precisely the 2008 crisis that may serve as the critical juncture initiating a descent
from this apex of potency.
In contrast to the inability of the Russian state to control widespread social disturbances
accompanying the 1998 fall-out, particularly the upheaval of the ―balance‖ established among
oligarchs and the public distress caused by economic depression, the Kremlin has succeeded in
preserving social stability since the start of the 2008 crisis. In assessing the significance of
popular opinion and activity for periods of crisis, Volkov and others emphasize the absence of a
24

Vladimir Mau, ―The Global Crisis As Seen from Russia.‖ Russia in Global Affairs¸vol. 1, January – March 2009.
William Cooper, ―Russia‘s Economic Performance and Policies and Their Implications for the United States.‖
26
Neil Robinson, ―The global economy, reform and crisis in Russia.‖
27
Andew Wilson, ―Russia‘s economic crisis – no cue for ‗Perestroika 2.0.‘‖ openDemorcracy Online. September 4,
2009.
25
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tradition of mass democratic protest inciting a shift in the power balance of the Russian ruling
elite, attributing this to the ―famous passivity‖28 of the Russian people that is often described as
the flip-side of ―an unrivalled ability to survive adversity.‖29 Today, some argue, unlimited
powers, especially in the realm of media, and sufficient financial resources allow the Kremlin to
exploit this dynamic and mitigate instances of social unrest much more swiftly and effectively
than a decade ago.30 Acknowledging that the Kremlin‘s approach has so far not significantly
resulted in societal upheaval, Aslund and Kuchins believe that the government has poorly
managed the crisis by ignoring its root causes.31 In their view, such a policy will yield results that
are ―politically and socially untenable.‖32 Perhaps, then, the time horizon for mobilization of
notable societal opposition is much longer than the average length of economic crisis.

Putin’s economic policy and the social contract
Literature related to the 2008 financial crisis devotes substantial attention to the economic
development agenda during Putin‘s presidency (2000 – 2008). Examination of the economic
preferences of Putin and his closest government advisors has been inextricably linked to
discussions pertaining to his conceptions of state power, state-society relations, democratic
freedom, and other notions. Understanding the formulation of Putin‘s brand of leadership has
fuelled scholarly debate, with the only point of agreement among top academics and researchers
being the conclusion that the Russian state is an enigma. Though scholars and pundits disagree

28

Vadim Volkov, ―Will the Financial Crisis Lead to Political Change in Russia?‖ PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo
No. 81. Eurasian Strategy Project, Walsh School of Foreign Service, September 2009.
29
Ibid
30
Ibid
31
The Russia Balance Sheet p 55
32
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about the degree and sustainability of Putin‘s monopoly on Russian political resources, he
undoubtedly carries substantial weight in economic policymaking today.
Clifford G. Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes believe President Putin held financial stability and
independence of his country as his primary objectives, which he achieved and sustained through
rapid accumulation of money into the oil-stabilization fund and into foreign exchange reserves.33
Broadly speaking, they believe four ideological principles guide the Putin administration‘s
economic agenda: 1) the economy is Russia‘s key strength in the world; 2) the economy should
be as strong and as efficient as possible; 3) the economy should ensure the priority of the state; 4)
the economy must be robust to crisis.34 Most of these objectives are often described as stemming
from ―never again‖ lessons learned after the 1998 crisis; different interpretations of this link
highlight Putin‘s personal desire never to again allow Russia to suffer from humiliation on the
international stage, and the belief that pursuit of these objectives constitutes the basis for Putin‘s
domestic popular and political support.
Based on this framework, Gaddy and Ickes posit that Putin relied on the global system to
intermediate the financial flows from Russia‘s own oil and gas export earnings into the domestic
corporate sector, simultaneously providing state wealth and affording control over domestic
private enterprise through a ―protection racket.‖35 The owners of Russia‘s most powerful
companies (oligarchs) were allowed to conduct business free from government appropriation as
long as they did not oppose Putin‘s tax regime, whose primary function was to channel more
resources to the federal government.36 This mechanism operated via the deficient financial
sector, which had shifted from financing government deficits in the 1990s to expanding lending

33

Clifford G. Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes, ―Putin's Third Way.‖ The National Interest. January 21, 2009.
Ibid
35
Ibid
36
Ibid
34
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to households and corporations in the Putin years,37 and therefore hinged heavily on international
economic developments. Gaddy and Ickes posit that Putin will seek to maintain financial
sovereignty, that is, autonomy from foreign influence in economic decision making, at all
costs.38 Steven Halliwell, like many others, points out that the crisis threatens Putin‘s ―grand
bargain‖ with Russian society – the exchange of basic freedoms for economic stability.39

Domestic politics
The present domestic political arrangement serves as both a determinant of policy
response to the crisis and a variable shaped by the economic implications of the crisis itself.
Mobilization of the political will for reform, a matter of political leadership influenced by its
ability to sustain economic growth, is frequently cited as the key factor in the implementation of
reforms.40 The preoccupation of the world‘s preeminent scholars of Russian politics with the
tandem of power at the federal level has raised a number of questions in the wake of the crisis.
President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin and their respective inner circles hold
allegiance to different groups and espouse differing conceptions of Russia‘s economic
development. Sestanovich and others suggest that the presence of ―liberal reformers‖ in the
Russian administration may shape the reform agenda, highlighting Medvedev‘s emphasis on the
importance of further reform and on cooperation with other countries. Have the policies of
Putin‘s clan been discredited, creating the potential for more liberal economic policymaking?
Would Putin seek to take ownership of such measures, or step back and permit Medvedev to

37

Eric Berglof and A. Lehmann, ―Sustaining Russia‘s Growth: The Role of Financial Reform,‖ Journal of
Comparative Economics, Volume 37, Issue 2, June 2009, P 198-206.
38
Ibid
39
Steven Halliwell, ―Russia and the Global Crisis: Consequences of Delayed Reform.‖ Strategic Asia 2009–10:
Economic Meltdown and Geopolitical Stability. National Bureau of Asian Research: 2009.
40
Anders Aslund and Andrew Kuchins, The Russia Balance Sheet.
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assume a leading role? To what extent is Medvedev more liberal than Putin, and would economic
policy under his rule differ dramatically from that of the past eight years? Although these are
undeniably interesting areas of inquiry, especially in light of Putin‘s indications that he will seek
a return to the presidency in 2012, this thesis will primary focus on the observable impacts of the
2008 crisis on policy choices available to the Russian government to argue that it has shifted the
composition of economic policymaking to allow for new or altered considerations regarding the
global economy and its relationship to the Russian economic condition. Awareness that the crisis
likely contributes to the evolution of fundamental aspects of Russian politics will contribute to a
nuanced analysis of its effects on viable policy choices.
Noting that elites and special interests would suffer from the economic reforms necessary
for Russia to overcome the recession, Hough analyzes potential responses through the lens of
incentives generated by potential economic reform. According to Robinson, short-term political
gain, buying off lobbies, and the protection of vested economic interests constituted government
objectives that hindered reform in the wake of the 1998 crash. Greene argues that evidence of
this dynamic in response to the 2008 crisis already exists: the government has tacitly allowed
various private and public sector interests to gain control of companies, including Aeroflot and
large banks, in order to satisfy the ruling elite.41

Scenarios for the future course of economic policy
Recent literature attempts to predict the future course of economic policy and the
development agenda by employing event-driven scenario frameworks differing across the factors
influencing the sequence and extent of reform. Erik Berglof and Alexander Lehmann focus on
the overall macroeconomic position as a driver of economic liberalization; in their view, ―the
41

Sam Greene, ―Domesticating Russia‘s Economic Crisis.‖ International Economic Bulletin, June 2009.
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prospect of several years of weak if not negative economic growth will likely weaken popular
support for further economic reforms‖ since rising inflation and a slowdown in credit expansion
may command the Kremlin‘s attention.42 Nicolay Petrov predicts that authoritarianism, not
economic liberalization, will rise in the near future, as the government does not yet appreciate
the seriousness of crisis impacts but will revert to traditional methods of control in attempt to
preserve political power. This prediction is consistent with the findings of Pitilk that ―an
institutionalized system of conflict management in constitutional democracies‖43 provides a
higher likelihood of successful responsive policy changes than does an authoritarian state like
Russia. Another perspective, led by Anders Aslund, posits three scenarios for the future: a) a
continuation of the Putin approach: low growth rate, living on energy resources, and maintaining
hard authoritarianism; b) a liberalization both of economics and politics, and opening up to the
West, the world, and increased globalization, and c) a serious crisis scenario.44 Putin‘s desire to
prevent the third scenario prompted him to let the more plausible policies recommended by
government liberals proceed; this is the driver of policy shifts. Similarly, Halliwell presents three
varying scenarios for duration of global recession and outlines policy implications on this basis.45

Scope for further research
As the country stands at a crossroads in the economic sphere, several facets of the 2008
crash impact on Russia have not yet been adequately addressed by existing literature. The global
nature of the crisis will certainly continue to have domestic implications. Medvedev and Putin
must work to facilitate recovery and cultivate a business-friendly, institutionally-sound
42

Eric Berglof, ―Sustaining Russia‘s Growth.‖
Hans Pitlik and S. Wirth, ―Do crises promote the extent of economic liberalization?: an empirical test.‖ European
Journal of Political Economy, Volume 19, Issue 3, September 2003, P 565-581.
44
―Russia‘s Road Back.‖ Interview with Anders Aslund.
45
Halliwell, ―Russia and the Global Crisis.‖
43
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environment in the long run; the policies available can cater to both domestic and international
constituencies, and the tradeoffs in seeking such a balance have yet to be studied in depth.
Increased social welfare and heightened international credibility might be obtainable in tandem,
not necessarily at one another‘s expense. Additionally, while the relatively small body of
literature pertaining to the recent crisis in Russia addresses political implications for Putin‘s
regime, there has been little work suggesting how such concerns will percolate through
policymaking channels into economic measures.
The unprecedented global scale of recession associated with this crisis offers the
possibility of exploring how shared negative experiences shape policy responses. To what extent
will considerations about cooperation for international economic recovery, for example,
coordination of central bank policies and limits on protectionism, factor into Russian policy
options? There is mixed evidence on whether banking crises encourage reforms in developing
countries; how do predictions change based on the presence of macroeconomic risk stemming
from global recession, length of recession, and impact on certain sectors of the real economy?
Important conclusions for other emerging markets or authoritarian states may be drawn from the
Russian experience thus far as to what constitutes a desirable balance between economic policies
promoting stability and those promoting international openness and efficiency. Finally, it will be
important to evaluate the broader implications of various economic reform scenarios for Russia‘s
foreign policy, and for the world economy.
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METHODOLOGY
In analyzing the effects of the 2008 global credit crisis on the Russian government policy
response, it is essential to first characterize the economic and political landscape prior to the
downturn, to identify key features of policymaking in this environment, and to understand the
channels through which external forces altered Russia‘s economy before and during the crisis
itself. The research question fundamentally pertains to tradeoffs facing policymakers seeking to
sustain economic growth: between adaptation and control, broadly speaking, and in particular
between the importance of considering the economic implications of external forces in
policymaking and responding to internally-driven policy needs. This, in turn, could imply
―tighter control over the economy, more constraints on the big businesses and less impetus
toward integration into the global economy‖46 on one hand, or a greater inclination to participate
openly in the global marketplace and relax state controls.
Scholars largely agree on the basic characteristics of the balance determined during
Vladimir Putin‘s tenure as President (2000-2008): in order to restore Russia‘s status as a strong
and sovereign nation and, by extension, to sustain political power, Putin believed in the necessity
of accumulating wealth for the country. This ensured social stability characterized by a fairly
consistent price level, job security, and other features that translated into a population largely
uncritical of the government.47 The desire to promote social stability came as a result of the
disastrous societal effects of the 1998 financial crisis, which left Russian citizens critical of the
government and fuelled years of short-lived and unstable governments. To Putin, this suggested
that a wealthy state could provide for its citizens in dire circumstances and withstand crisis with
a higher likelihood, ensuring political continuity and power. Thus, the pursuit of such ―financial
46
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sovereignty‖48 conditioned Putin‘s choice of economic policy. The state maintained tight control
over domestic private enterprise, and employed the Russian financial sector to intermediate
profits from commodities exports into state reserves. Scholars refer to the acceptance of this
economic arrangement in return for domestic price stability and employment levels as the
implicit ―social contract.‖49
The Putin economic development agenda hinged on international economic activity in a
particular manner: oil prices determined government revenues, and, accordingly, the state
budget. In its approach, the Kremlin believed the internal system it constructed could control and
direct external flows to enrich the nation. The young body of scholarship pertaining to the effects
of the recent crisis on Russia‘s economy demonstrates the severity of impacts on multiple
dimensions; this analysis seeks to strengthen the understanding of how these effects translate into
recovery measures and contribute to the formulation of long-term economic development
strategy. In doing so, it will contribute to the study of how economic crises encourage (or
discourage) economic reform and how easily governments may align domestic goals to
productively and reliably sustain growth and promote wealth under present levels of
globalization.
Essentially, I argue that the effects of the 2008 crisis have caused the Russian
government, led by Putin, who remains the chief policymaker, to put forth policies and take
actions that would not have been pursued in the absence of such a cataclysmic event. It is
precisely the newest expression of risk originating abroad that drives this shifting mindset. There
was little incentive to deviate from the economic structures put in place by Putin before the
crisis; despite allowing for swift and appropriate actions in the immediate post-crisis period, the
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system failed to protect fully against a downturn and limited financial capacity of the state. The
Kremlin now looks for cues regarding global recovery as it formulates economic policy for
recovery and long-term growth. Struggling to balance preservation of political power, financial
sovereignty, and social stability, it has begun to formulate an economic policy that demonstrates
the tradeoffs between policies favoring domestic priorities and those conducive to stability in an
internationally integrated economy. To be sure, Putin and Medvedev aim to project confidence in
Russia‘s propensity to navigate the economic storm in pursuit of sustaining the social contract
and maintaining similar domestic objectives as before. Individual preferences of government
officials, social unrest, and other factors may explain the state‘s recovery policies. Yet the
features of the crisis response that have already emerged suggest a mounting appreciation for the
inevitable need for policies to respond to the present vulnerability of the Russian system to
external forces. Given the difficulty of predicting the path of global recovery, the analysis will
refer to three exogenously determined scenarios with varying levels of energy prices and length
of recession in the rest of the world: 1) long and deep global recession and energy prices sink
near historic lows; 2) brief recession and strong rebound of energy prices; 3) moderate recovery,
and energy prices stay at historically elevated levels. Though the hypothesis posits that the
Russian state now formulates policy to a greater degree by attempting to discern which of these
scenarios will occur, the tempered growth forecasts at the end of December 2008 renders it likely
that a quick recovery has been ruled out. A scenario between 1) and 3), that is, moderate
recovery and gradual rebound of oil prices (though not to previously record high levels) now
seems to be the most likely.
Process tracing allows the most effective illumination of the links between globalization,
defined as international economic integration, the 2008 financial crisis, and economic strategy
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formulation. First, it is necessary to determine the pillars of Putin‘s economic policy during the
boom years, as well as what particular structures characterized Russian integration into the
global financial economy since 1998. Policies on economic growth, inflation, the ruble exchange
rate, state budgetary plans, the evolution of the financial sector, foreign direct investment, capital
flows and state ownership of assets will be examined. Based on this initial scenario, it will
become possible to envision a picture of what reform would entail and construct a counterfactual
understanding of what Russia‘s trajectory could have been had the financial crisis not occurred.
WTO accession, the introduction of transparent procurement processes for major investments,
and a halt or reversal in nationalization projects are all examples of positive orientation towards
global economic integration, as they demonstrate willingness to adhere to international norms of
transparency, competition and unobstructed flows of goods and capital across borders. The
relative weight of alternate explanatory factors, including personal preferences of leaders and
societal demands, will be gauged by exploring whether they may be causally linked to significant
policy decisions. To the extent reliable information is available through Western media, I will
identify ―core interests‖ for individuals and government agencies participating in economic
policymaking between 2000 and 2008; these may comprise specific policy preferences, broader
ideological tendencies, or considerations about political power or social standing of tangential
relation to formulation of preferences for economic policy. This section of the analysis will be
limited by the restricted ability of Western media provide a thorough description of the actions
and perspectives of these actors as a result of limitations to access imposed by the Russian state.
As there are a multitude of approaches to describing personal preferences of Russian
policymakers, I will consult the top scholars of Russian politics to sketch the basic contours of
individual motivations and tendencies; for a data point in which a given actor is significant, I will
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consult the relevant core preference to examine whether the action taken showed consistency
with this preference. If it did not, I will examine other independent variables. If it did, which I
expect to be the case in the majority of instances, a more nuanced analysis of the degree of
continuity between preferences and actions taken will be required.
Scholarly consensus on the preferences of Russian citizens will determine the basis for
societal demands, an alternate explanatory factor for the economic policy chosen by the Russian
government thus far. Based on public opinion survey data from the period 2000 – 2008
indicating satisfaction with economic indicators such as wages, employment levels and prices, I
will identify the chief areas of concern for the Russian public. Given Russia‘s authoritarian
tradition, I expect to find that societal demands carry relatively less weight in policymaking, as
they are seldom articulated aggressively and pointedly enough to significantly steer leaders
against their personal preferences. In the particular case of my research question, I expect that in
the short-term, societal demands have prompted the Russian government to formulate recovery
measures addressing first and foremost these needs. The tension lies between popular demands,
that is, democracy, and the interests of individual leaders – autocracy. Importantly, the financial
crisis and the external factors it injects into policymaking affects both these actors and, by
extension, their preferences for future economic policy.
The 2008 financial crisis may be viewed as a ―critical juncture‖50 in Russian economic
policymaking, inviting the possibility of a dramatic shift in the direction of the nation‘s longterm economic development. Four major shocks transmitted the global crisis in Russia:

1) The intensification of the global crisis caused a sudden stop and then a reversal in capital
flows out of Russia.
50

Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen, ―The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative and
Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism.‖ World Politics 59, April 2007. P 347
Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2010
Dasha Barannik, College ‗10,

22

2) The global credit crunch and tightening external borrowing conditions exacerbated
liquidity problems in Russia‘s banking system.
3) A sharp drop in the price of oil began to erode Russia‘s fiscal and external account
surpluses and its huge international currency reserves.
4) Russia‘s stock market experienced a massive decline––largely reflecting the global loss
of confidence and the precipitous drop in the price of oil.51

Using process tracing, the analysis will explain how the external factors listed above affected the
Russian economy, for example, reducing the balance sheets in three sectors (government,
corporations and households). The first causal mechanism will thus be established between the
externally determined variables (e.g. commodities prices, capital inflows), the choice of domestic
institutions and policies, and resulting economic circumstances. The actions of the Kremlin since
August 2008 in response to the specific externally-driven economic circumstances identified will
subsequently be compared to pre-crisis policies and linked back to externally driven occurrences
by rigorous and systematic reconstruction of each step of the decision-making process;52 this will
form the second causal mechanism. Government decisions pertaining to exchange rate dynamics,
stimulus spending, lending to corporations and other entities, and messages regarding the crisis
and recovery measures offer unique data points which may have occurred following precise
events in the global economy impacting particular aspects of the Russian economy.
It is important to note that both a tightening of state control and a more global orientation
are compatible with a state more acutely aware of its economy‘s exposure to external shocks. If
the Kremlin did not respond to exogenous incidents that negatively impacted its pre-crisis
economic agenda, such as reductions in stabilization fund reserves, the argument that policy is

51
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becoming increasingly responsive to global events is undermined. As Capoccia and Kelemen
note, counterfactual analysis of the plausible consequences of other, viable choices that were not
taken is necessary for a deeper understanding of the driving forces.53 Data pertaining to
government discussions and policies ultimately not chosen may be difficult to access and limited
due to the still-evolving nature of the crisis response; furthermore, the government censors
Russian media coverage of the crisis and has begun conducting discussions regarding economic
policy in closed sessions. Limited access to reliable sources of information, however, will not
detract from the power of the causal linkages outlined in this section to provide a deep
understanding of the key decisions made thus far and their immediate context.54
To explore whether the Kremlin is in fact responding to alternative independent variables
more so than to external forces, episodes of social unrest, like the January 2009 protests in
Vladivostok, will be similarly examined in search of connected policy responses. Russia has a
number of ―company-towns‖ whose livelihood depends largely on industrial production in
factories of one or a few large enterprises. Federal policies and actions towards theses regions
have received much attention during the crisis, as these areas, which were adversely affected by
the crisis, are viewed as potential hot spots for social unrest. Social stability is itself a variable
affected by the economic crisis, as it has led to declining incomes and employment and abrupt
reductions in social services.55 Here the analysis will proceed from data points of social
instability, identified primarily through reputable media outlets, to government responses.
Policies determined as responding primarily to domestic constituencies may or may not be in line
with those ―advocated‖ by the global economy, that is, those policies that the first stage of
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analysis will identify as components of a globally-oriented reform agenda. To separate the
influence of the economic crisis from the variable of social stability, I will assess government
economic policy responses to episodes of social unrest unconnected with the global factors of the
present downturn. There may be instances when the government has acted preemptively or
responded in a manner uncharacteristic of its prior relationship with society, indicating a shift in
the approach to this relationship. Most instances of social unrest occurring after August 2008
will likely be linked indirectly to the external effects of the financial crisis, though some episodes
may be decoupled from a direct relationship.
Additionally, no analysis of decision-making within the Russian state can ignore the
complex interplay among Kremlin factions and individuals in power. Though financial policy is
not a traditional responsibility of the Russian president, in October 2008 Medvedev created a
―Council for the Development of the Financial Markets of the Russian Federation under the
auspices of the President of the Russian Federation‖ which assigned his administration several
responsibilities in this domain.56 Later, he criticized the government, though not Putin directly,
for a slow crisis response.57 President Dmitri Medvedev, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin,
Medvedev‘s Deputy Chief of Staff Vladislav Surkov, Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin and
others harbor individual political ambitions, and so-called ―liberal reformers‖58 in the Medvedev
and Putin administrations in the post-crisis period also exert influence on economic
policymaking; however, this thesis will proceed from the assumption that the liberal clan
advocating economic liberalization and market-promoting structural reforms held a much smaller
share of economic decision making up to 2008. The degree of this influence varies, however,
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with the relative importance Putin assigns to the economic policy recommendations of this
group. I will seek anecdotal evidence from news articles, interviews and secondary sources to
assess the implications shifting balances of power have on the economic agenda. If Putin will
seek to maintain the existing political equilibrium, domestic politics suggest he should continue
to suppress liberal challengers. Support for these individuals and their policies may prove
politically destabilizing and hence undesirable. However, if my argument is correct, the Putin
economic plan will prove unsustainable in the future due to the vulnerability it creates for the
Russian economy. It would be irrational to assume that Russian officials are completely blind to
this idea; therefore, the process of economic policymaking occurring today is closely linked with
Putin‘s reformulation of a strategy to ensure his political survival. How different the resulting
policies and economic landscape will be remains to be seen.
While outside the particular lens through which this thesis approaches the government
response to the Russian financial crisis, my hypothesis assumes that given Russia‘s authoritarian
decision-making regime and lack of historical precedence for democratic political activism, a
turn towards or away from globalization will be marginally influenced by popular demand for
change, especially in the long term. Traditionally, the Russian population has harbored a high
threshold for authoritarianism,59 seemingly preferring societal stability to disruption caused by
democratic opposition. This supposition justifies the focus on government responses to the 2008
crisis. On this dimension, a critical comparison of recent social unrest with responses to instances
of social disruption following the 1998 crisis will be especially illuminating. Thus far, the
accumulated financial resources have allowed the government to stem potential points of popular
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discontent; for instance, $1 billion was pledged to support the ailing automobile industry60 and
four regional governors removed on the basis of their alleged failure to fight the crisis.61 Whereas
after 1998 the government lacked the political and fiscal resources to mitigate detriment to
society, leading to the introduction of a series of economic reforms, the strengthened capacity of
the state today allows it to act more effectively towards this end. I will attempt to show that to
the extent it is possible to contain this source of instability, the state will sense less of a need to
carry out reform. Prolonged global recovery, however, will continue to spark potential instances
of political insecurity; greater appreciation for this dynamic will prompt a reengineering of
policy.
The Russian economic situation created by the 2008 crisis differs markedly from the
1998 post-crisis conditions across several dimensions that illustrate increased global economic
integration. Increased capital flows and implied economic, consumption and income risk, for
example, suggest that if the Russian government wanted to maintain certain domestic
employment and price levels, it should increase spending on programs aimed at mitigating risk to
these factors. There is disagreement within existing scholarship over the degree to which the
Kremlin underestimated the risk external forces posed to internal stability when constructing
economic policy in the period 2000-2008. In any case, the 2008 crisis exposed the weaknesses of
the system. The acute effects of Russia‘s two financial crises, despite their differences, and
scholarship by Williamson, Drazen and Easterly indicating the existence of a link between crisis
and economic reform62 justifies the use of this comparison and the choice of 2000 – 2008 as the
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―pre-crisis‖ time frame during which the social contract to be assessed (antecedent condition)
came into being.
Since the start of the crisis, the state demonstrated an evolution of interpretation of the
length of recovery, at first devoting minimal attention to crisis and its effects on Russia, then
acquiescing to the incontestable reality that much more elaborate involvement would be required
on the part of the state. In this respect, policymakers have already ruled out the possibility of
Russia escaping global crisis unscathed. Stephen Halliwell‘s three varying scenarios for the
duration of global recession63 will provide a framework for an analysis of the future impact
external forces will have on Russian balance sheets in three sectors and on social stability, a core
component of the social contract. Conclusions regarding the tradeoffs between domestically
oriented and externally driven policies inherent to each scenario will be made and compared to
the policy choices made thus far by the Kremlin. In this manner, this analysis will provide insight
into the importance of external scenario planning for the Russian government in the aftermath of
the financial crisis.
This thesis seeks to explain the effects of the crisis on the Russian social contract, that is,
the particular balance of domestic spending and welfare provision with international economic
integration sustained over the past eight years. The chosen analytical framework holds constant
the Kremlin‘s desire to maintain its current level of political power in order to focus the analysis
on the effects of globalization, as exacerbated by the financial crisis, as the primary causal
mechanism in operation to limit the scope of viable policy choices. The purpose of this constant
is to remove from consideration the possibility that Putin wishes to radically reduce his power
for reasons unconnected to the crisis, altogether another field of inquiry; this is consistent with
the hypothesis that the crisis will serve as a factor making the pursuit of this constant more
63
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challenging. Though other authoritarian states and emerging economies undoubtedly also inject
considerations about the global economy into policymaking, there are simply too many variables
that must be controlled for in such comparative case studies; conversely, attempting to
operationalize complex societal and political-economic arrangements would lessen the certainty
with which any conclusions could be applied to Russia. The subjective nature of certain elements
of the Kremlin ―response,‖ in particular, messaging, and the uniqueness of their expression to
Russia‘s particular political and societal landscape render an event-driven process tracing
analysis over several components of the crisis impact the most useful analytical approach. The
next section will develop a full depiction of economic policy and its evolution in parallel with
Russia‘s global economic integration since 1999 with the goal of illustrating the systemic points
of greatest openness and vulnerability to external forces and the policies that created and
sustained them. A comprehensive assessment of other determinants of economic policy, such as
popular support and the preferences of policymaking clans, will provide the basis for evaluating
the channels through which policymakers interpret the crisis and any changes in relative
importance of the independent variables that have come about as a result.
Having outlined a roadmap by which the analysis will proceed and noting the limitations
of such an approach, the next chapter will identify a sequence of events that have occurred as
part of the crisis since 2008. Process tracing will subsequently be carried out from each external
event to actions taken by the Russian state. Alternative options will be identified by referencing
scholarly works and commentary on the subject. In this examination it will be important to be
mindful of the connections between external events, their impact through Russia‘s
institutions/domestic setting, and features of the crisis that are primarily domestically-rooted.
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EXTERNAL EVENTS
The 2008 global financial crisis hit Russia swiftly and severely, validating the assertion
made in 2007 by experts Andrew Kuchins and Thomas Graham that, ―the state of the global
economy is the most important external driver for Russia‘s future… If we experience a major
recession or even more serious economic downturn in the next decade, Russia will be adversely
affected.”64 In this section I will first construct an understanding of the drivers and main
components of economic policy during the Putin presidency, as well as an outline of the major
policies and government actions that would constitute a departure from the route set forth during
this period. The relative importance of popular demands and social unrest in economic
policymaking will be considered. In the first section of this chapter I will use process tracing to
follow how incidents originating in foreign economies transmitted the economic crisis to Russia
and what impact this had on government actions. Next, I will use events exemplifying the social
dimension of the economic crisis as data points for analysis of the government‘s response. Given
the exceptional magnitude and nature of the economic crisis, as well as the historical political
apathy and tolerance for authoritarianism of the Russian population, I expect to find evidence
that the government predicated its actions on the impact of the crisis and its future course,
limited in its viable policy options as a result of external forces. The state likely continued to
seek maintenance of the political status quo, but faced new challenges in doing so as a result of
the crisis.

Putin’s economic policy and its trajectory

64
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In the words of Clifford Gaddy and Barry Ickes, Putin pursued ―dual policy objectives of
optimal efficiency and maximum robustness to short-term shocks‖65 during his tenure as
president (2000-2008). This comprised the establishment of firm federal government control
over the economy and a symbiotic relationship with major players in the business sector. Making
the Russian economy robust to crisis constituted a guiding principle for Putin‘s economic
policymaking; based on the radical onset of economic depression in connection with the 1998
financial crisis, the priority was ―not to invest in long-term growth but to invest in enhancing
Russia‘s resiliency to short-term shocks.‖66 Repayment of foreign debt and accumulation of vast
financial reserves demonstrated a commitment to establishing so-called Russian financial
sovereignty, whereby the state would not have loan obligations to international organizations or
foreign governments and would have the financial resources to cushion its internal prices and
economy from unexpected economic shocks. Reserves of foreign-denominated currency are
needed to cover critical imports, repayment schedules of foreign debt, and to defend the national
currency to maintain a stable exchange rate.
According to Anders Aslund, ―Putin‘s economic policy contains two constant, positive
features: a strong emphasis on macroeconomic stability and high economic growth;‖67 there is
agreement among experts that the Putin administration adhered to a conservative and responsible
macroeconomic policy. Until October 2007, the government maintained fiscal discipline with
budget surpluses every year from 2000 (ranging from 2.4 percent of GDP in 200168 to 5.4
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percent of GDP in 2007.69 When inflation began to rise, government expenditures increased.
Prudent financial planning did occur during the latter half of Putin‘s presidency: the
accumulation of oil-export duties and taxes for the extraction of natural resources into a National
Stabilization Fund, set up in 2004, indicated Putin‘s desire to maintain budgetary surpluses and a
cushion of foreign reserves in case of currency shocks. Concurrently, the federal government
managed a relatively small budget constituting 21-22 percent of GDP, of which only a very
limited portion was dedicated to development of infrastructure, education, technology and other
areas. As a consequence, fiscal austerity caused the government to avoid large expenditures on
―national projects‖ of proclaimed importance, such as health, education, housing and
infrastructure. Inflation proved to be Putin‘s greatest challenge; a 40 percent jump in government
spending and record net capital inflow of $82.3 billion in 2007 spurred price growth,70 which the
Russian Central Bank struggled to manage concurrently with the exchange rate. By using ample
foreign currency reserves to manage the ruble, the Central Bank effectively injected money into
the domestic economy to weaken the currency, thereby fuelling inflation.
Putin‘s conception of the relationship between the state and big business hinged on a desire
―to set up a system that could maximally exploit the advantages of the market economy while
ensuring that the interests of private business owners would always remain subordinate to the
strategic interests of the state.‖71 Importantly, Putin recognized and sought an efficient, modern
economy, recognizing that it is a means to achievement of full sovereignty and the ability to
shape Russia‘s destiny. In 2005, he described this condition by stating, ―Russia will decide itself
how it can implement the principles of freedom and democracy, taking into account its historical,
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geopolitical and other specificities. As a sovereign state, Russia can and will independently
establish for itself the timeframe and conditions for moving along this path.‖72 For the purposes
of this thesis, Putin‘s conception of sovereignty comprised financial sovereignty (freedom from
outstanding foreign debts and substantial financial resources to counteract currency shocks) as
well as international political sovereignty (including freedom from Western incursions into the
former Soviet Union).73 Between 2000 and 2002 he augmented the market reforms initiated
under Boris Yeltsin. A radical new flat income tax was introduced; registration, licensing and
standardization for small and medium enterprises were simplified; and the sale of agricultural
land became legal.74 Putin regularly spoke in favor of private ownership and the development of
a robust, competitive economy. Concurrently, however, regular off-budget, so-called ―voluntary
contributions,‖ by some of the country‘s largest and wealthiest companies to local and regional
governments created a system of informal taxation by the state.75 The Yukos affair in 2003,
during which Putin confiscated the successful company of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a big
businessman and vocal critic of the Putin regime who controlled a large proportion of the private
sector, ushered in an era of renationalization. As oil prices rose in 2004, all economic reform
halted; the correlation between slowing reform and rising oil prices is evident here. By 2008,
corruption, inefficient state enterprises, and arbitrary interpretation of tax codes plagued the
economy in addition to a high dependency on commodity exports. As Andrew Kuchins notes, ―It
would be wrong, however, simply to categorize Russia as a petro-state with a non-diversified
economy. Microeconomic enterprise restructuring has also contributed to the Russian economic
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boom, and other sectors of the economy…including consumer goods, construction, and
telecommunications, are experiencing tremendous growth‖ which fuelled GDP expansion in
2007 despite slumping oil prices.76 While progress did occur in these other sectors, the vast
dominance of oil exports in economic growth overshadowed alternative channels in the
government agenda.
The Russian government demonstrated a firm commitment to market methods and openness
to the global economy. Whereas Prime Minister Vladimir Putin did not devote significant
attention to Russian accession to the World Trade Organization during his last term as president,
President Dmitry Medvedev made many remarks about the benefits of joining for the Russian
economy.77 In addition to encouraging international trade beginning in the early reform period
and creating an environment receptive to foreign direct investment, the Russian government
presided over the development of an internationally engaged financial sector. Russian firms held
initial public offerings in New York and London, Western firms financed Russian companies‘
expansion, and foreigners actively traded shares on the Russian stock market. The country
enjoyed $4.2 billion of portfolio foreign investment and nearly $500 billion in private credits
from foreigners in 2007.78The combination of the firm reliance on natural resources as a driver of
the economy and an underdeveloped financial sector motivated the emergence of the following
arrangement to redistribute wealth from energy production back into the economy, a mechanism
that ―remains key to understanding the country‘s political economy.‖79 Russian companies
exported oil to the West; the Russian government taxed the export earnings; the Russian
government lent this money to Western governments; and then, given the collateral represented
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by Russian holdings of Western debt, Western banks lent the funds back to Russian companies,
including those that had earned them in the first place.80 In effect, Western banks rolled over
Russian corporate debts throughout the 2000s, providing financial intermediation that could not
be obtained domestically. During this time, major Russian firms prospered financially and
expanded globally, all while accumulating extensive foreign debts; this development received
little attention amidst the country‘s booming economic growth.
In September 2007 the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade published the
―Concept of Long-term Socioeconomic Development of the Russian Federation,‖ which outlined
a development plan through 2020 (also referred to as the Russia 2020 Plan). The ultimate goal of
the Concept is for Russia to become one of the world‘s top five economies and establish itself as
a leader in technological innovation and global energy infrastructure, as well as a major
international financial center. Though much energy is devoted to outlining this vision of Russia
as a center of innovation, scholars doubt that the plan‘s ambitious growth targets will be
achieved due to the unwillingness of the government to address the root threats to growth.
Kuchins, Aslund and others point out that since the introduction of this document little action has
been taken in the sectors identified; according to these experts, the government‘s inaction
regarding the Russia 2020 plan exemplifies the lack of credibility associated with such
commitments.
Centralization of economic policymaking at the federal government level occurred during
Putin‘s presidency, leading to what some scholars identify as a top structural challenge: a
hypertrophied, inert and corrupt state bureaucracy. Michael McFaul notes that the 1998 financial
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crisis ―put an end to major debate over economic policy in Russia,‖81 referring to the consensus
for fiscal austerity which existed at the time between society and its rulers. Putin‘s rise to power
coincided with a strengthening of authoritarianism and a rollback of democracy. Early in his
tenure, Putin concentrated on consolidating political power in the Duma and Federation Council,
and among regional governors. Having amassed substantial political capital (Putin‘s approval
ratings stood at 70 percent in 200282), he cleared the way for economic policy to be formulated at
the top. McFaul notes that, ―with so much money from oil windfalls in the Kremlin's coffers,
Putin could crack down on or co-opt independent sources of political power.‖83The government
maintained the social contract existing prior to the crisis with relatively minimal social dissent,
and certainly without large-scale threats to the existing order. In 2005, Putin responded to
weeklong protests by pensioners by doubling increases in pension payments and reintroducing
free public transport for these individuals.84 This so-called Chintz Revolution marked the first
time that Putin‘s regime faced anything close to an existential challenge; it received serious
attention in Russian and foreign media. Though the incident passed without revolution and
political upheaval, in the view of Sam Greene it highlighted the existence of a latent
dissatisfaction with the provisions of the social contract, a force that had potential to become
overt under certain pressures.85 The Kremlin delayed responding to the 2005 unrest, perhaps a
reflection of incoherence and poor preparation in internal deliberations about how to placate the
dissatisfaction. Ultimately, Putin acquiesced, and despite temporarily dented popularity ratings
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he maintained political power and sovereignty in economic decision-making. The pensioners‘
crisis did little to alter the weight that the welfare of the population at large carried in
considerations of economic policymaking. ―Labor unrest has not played a large role in Russia
since the collapse of the Soviet Union,‖86 write Andrew Kuchins and Thomas Graham. The
residual memory of the 1990s has seemed to lead Russians to prefer stability and prosperity over
democracy, a potential explanation for the parallel emergence of an enriched middle class and an
increasingly authoritarian and centralized state.
With so much of Putin‘s economic policy predicated on sustained economic growth
bolstered by high oil prices, the links between high natural resource rents and mounting
autocracy would likely grow stronger. Existing literature describes the link between a ruling elite
largely dependent on resource rents and the continuation of policies aimed at maintaining a
degree of exclusive access to the benefits of these rents through authoritarian political policies.
The suppression of democracy in the presence of this economic dynamic can continue until
resources begin declining; in the case of Russia, the time horizon for falling commodities prices
and oil and gas resource depletion seemed far off before the crisis, leading to the prediction that
efforts at finding new sources of economic growth, improving investment and productivity, and
especially policies favoring democracy faced little likelihood of becoming government priorities.
The macroeconomic revolution that occurred between 2000 and 2008 fuelled the independence
and power felt by those in the state apparatus. In December 2007, the public economic rhetoric
became ―statist;‖ Putin espoused ―protectionism, state intervention, and subsidies,‖ lessening the
probability of a shift to progressive structural reforms.87 Deviating from the economic trajectory
constructed by Putin and continued by Medvedev would be costly from the perspective of the
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ruling elite, as it would cause uncertainty over control of economic policy and, subsequently, the
balance of power among individuals in leadership positions. Putin worked diligently to
consolidate power in the early years of his presidency, and any deviation from this standard,
whether necessitated by outside forces or by his own will, would likely occur gradually.
Additionally, existing scholarship generally agrees on the lack the impetus for reform from
below, that is, from the Russian populace, a phenomenon consistent with Russia‘s absence of a
tradition of popular political activism. It is important to note, however, that the social contract
and its associate authoritarianism thrives under the consent of the governed; Russian citizens do
not want a return to the chaos and poverty of post-1998, and Putin offered a system addressing
these concerns. In the words of Anders Aslund, ―the emergent, highly centralized government,
combined with a weak and submissive society, is the hallmark of traditional Russian
paternalism.‖88

Conceptions of reform
Given the trajectory set forth by these economic policies and priorities, which contain
elements of economic liberalization and political centralization, it is possible to outline the
actions and policies that would constitute reform. The understanding of immediate pre-crisis
economic policy is limited, however by the multitude of mixed signals sent from the Kremlin
regarding factors, such as the approach to state corporations and international integration, which
continued when the crisis hit in late July 2008; as Aslund notes, ―Russia‘s course is difficult to
discern because overt economic policy changes every few months with the oil price.‖89
Nevertheless, experts and think tank leaders have put forth several papers outlining future
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scenarios for Russia‘s political and economic situation, the most cited being Alternative Futures
for Russia to 2017 from the Center for Strategic and International Studies. It is important to
distinguish between long-term, structural objectives carrying broader political and social
implications and more distinct policies representing deviations from the pre-crisis course.

Based on a variety of interpretations and analyses, reforms include:









Opening the closed economy and improvement of the business environment:
deregulation, privatization, administrative reform freeing small and medium businesses
from bureaucratic red tape;
Strengthening the rule of law and enforcement of property rights;90
Concentrated efforts at international cooperation and institutional integration:
aggressive pursuit of WTO accession through negotiations and compliance with entry
standards;
Improvement of productivity and greater openness: transparent procurement
procedures for major investments, increase investment to over 23 percent of GDP;
policy concentration on infrastructure and human capital; movement away from heavy
monopolization in the economy, increasingly protectionist policies, and state support
for failing industries
Greater macroeconomic stability through monetary policy: allow the ruble to float
freely, relax preferred rate of 24–25 rubles to the dollar, target inflation as opposed to
money supply, raise interest rates to achieve positive real interest rates
Improvement of the banking system: raise the general capital requirements of banks,
reduce the amount of related party lending, privatization, increase foreign ownership
Fiscal policy (pro-cyclical in the pre-crisis period): pursue budget deficits with
temporary fiscal stimuli (a combination of spending increases and targeted tax cuts) to
unlock investment and boost flagging aggregate demand,91 adjust long-term
expenditures to ensure fiscal sustainability

Broadly speaking, measures causing the Russian economy to become less centralized,
better managed with less state intervention, to exhibit more trust between business and
government and less hostility to foreign investors all indicate reform. Furthermore, one can
envision a more nuanced notion of ―reform:‖ having considered external factors more so than
90
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before, the Russian government may pursue policies that do not differ significantly from precrisis ones, or may in fact tip even further away from the above policies than before towards state
involvement in economic affairs (for example, through nationalization). This response would
indicate a ―tightening‖ of state control over the economy in attempt to mitigate perceived
vulnerability caused by external forces. The existence of this type of shift motivated by external
shocks from the financial crisis, while certainly more difficult to detect and prove, would
demonstrate that Russian policymakers now interpret external factors differently – as
necessitating stronger state guidance than before.
Several actors hold a stake in Russian economic policymaking; this thesis assumes that
Vladimir Putin retains a major influence over the direction of the country‘s economic
development, and thus economic policy remained consistent during the transition of the
presidency from Putin to Medvedev in 2008. In October 2008 Medvedev created a ―Council for
the Development of the Financial Markets of the Russian Federation under the auspices of the
President of the Russian Federation‖ and allocated the portfolio of financial policy to his array of
powers, though financial policy and economic policy are typically handled by the Prime
Minister.92 The Council is chaired by First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov, who is also the
head of the Anti-Crisis Committee of the government, and its members include Arkadij
Dvorkovich, Medvedev‘s economic affairs aide, Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister
Alexei Kudrin, Minister for Economic Development and Trade Elvira Nabuillina, and Chairman
of the Central Bank Sergei Ignatjev.93 Prime Minister Putin is not a member of the Council. The
Ministry of Finance oversees macroeconomic stability and inflation control; the Central Bank

92

Dr. Eberhard Schneider, ―Split in the Russian Political Tandem?‖ Caucasian Review of Internaitonal Affairs. Vol
3 (2) – Spring 2009.
93
Ibid
Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2010
Dasha Barannik, College ‗10,

40

―stimulates‖ economic growth, which it has attempted to facilitate in the past decade by ―keeping
the exchange rate at a lower level than it would be under a floating exchange rate regime.‖94

Transmission of global crisis to Russia: process tracing of external events
The Russian reaction to the global financial crisis evolved from initial confidence in the
country‘s insulation from adverse effects and blaming of the American-led capitalist system to a
realization the crisis threatened the utter collapse of entire segments of the Russian economy and
the foundation of state power itself. Since the effects of the global crisis began to emerge in
Russia in August 2008, Russian policymakers have implemented an extensive set of policy
measures geared towards the provision of liquidity (domestic and external, short-term and long
term), direct support to the stock markets and the banking sector, and fiscal support for the
maintenance of the level of economic activity and of the exchange rate regime. Many actions of
the Russian government occurred one to ten days after a significant event of foreign origin that in
some manner transmitted the global crisis to Russia‘s capital and current accounts with negative
consequences. The transmission mechanisms may be broadly segmented into those originating
in the financial sector and those operating through the real sector of the economy.
Stimulus
In September 2008, the United States stock markets plunged as the global crisis hit its
most critical stage. Sharp withdrawals from money markets instigated a global investment panic;
as a result, international investors cashed out their Russian holdings – which at that point
accounted for about half the Russian stock market – in a bid to generate cash and cover their

94

What Russia has to learn from the crisis: Macroeconomic policy. Sberbank Center for Macroeconomic Research.
November 27, 2009.
Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2010
Dasha Barannik, College ‗10,

41

obligations elsewhere.95 By October 2008, foreign investors withdrew $74 billion out of the
market.96 The dollar-denominated RTS and ruble-denominated MICEX (Russian stock markets)
fell by 20 percent on September 16, 2008, eventually plummeting by over 60 percent. 97 In
response to these events, which had constricted the external debt-financing channels to Russian
borrowers, the Russian government created a $130 billion rescue package under which the
Central Bank and Finance Ministry bought shares in Russian companies and strengthened bank
balance sheets. The Central Bank and National Welfare Fund would loan the equivalent of $36.1
billion to Sberbank, VTB (formerly Vneshtorgbank) and VEB (Development Bank) at 7 percent
interest for five years (later raised to ten years).98 These state-supported banks were instructed by
the government to loan to Russian banks and corporations whose liquidity, previously foreign
funded, had dried up with the massive capital outflows. European bank failures continued
throughout September, causing a fluctuating Russian stock market and increasing liquidity
pressures. Medvedev pledged an estimated 400 billion rubles ($15 billion) of additional
liquidity, and the reserve requirements dropped to 0.5 percent.99 Liquidity injections continued
until February 2009 and represented the first time in years that the Central Bank had used a
policy other than restriction of foreign exchange reserves to drive monetary growth.
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Exchange rate
Capital outflows catalyzed by global crisis impacted the Russian government‘s exchange
rate policy. Between 2002 and 2008 the ruble, bolstered by high oil prices and large balance of
payments surpluses, appreciated 36 percent to the dollar, encouraging foreign borrowing and
making exports, particularly those in commodities, more globally competitive (see Chart 2).100
Prior to November 2008, the Central Bank was able to maintain the ruble within its
desired dollar exchange rate despite a 4.5 percent fall in September, spending a total of $16.7
billion in the week ending October 3.101
Total hard currency reserves amounted
to $546 billion, down from a peak of
$596 billion on July 31.102 In November
2008, however, the country experienced
a sharp reduction in its trade surplus
(caused by a fall in global oil prices,
detailed below), initiating depreciation
and large capital outflows that prompted
a shift in the Central Bank‘s exchange
rate policy (see Chart 4). Internally, defense of the ruble likely came to be viewed as too rigid; in
its place, the Central Bank began employing incremental devaluations of roughly 1 percent
against the previously used basket comprised of 55 percent US dollar and 45 percent Euro. As
the year, and the crisis, progressed, the devaluations became more frequent: ―from once per week
in November 2008, they reached three devaluations per week in December 2008, and four by
100
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Chart 4: Russia’s Foreign Currency Reserves, 1/08 – 10/09

mid-January 2009.‖103 Gradual devaluation
―allowed households to protect savings,
banks to arbitrage between unsecured loans
and the pace of devaluation pace, and
helped stabilize banking sector,‖104 but
made foreign exchange speculation very
profitable; to address this issue, the Bank
of Russia raised interest rates to stabilize
devaluation expectations. According to an
analysis by Sberbank, one of Russia‘s state
banks, the policy of gradual devaluation caused lost GDP growth.105 On January 22, 2009, the
Central Bank stated that it would allow the ruble to fall freely up to 10 percent, then pledged to
defend it indefinitely at this level. Anders Aslund recognizes the present level as a ―realistic
market exchange rate.‖106Although hemorrhaging foreign exchange reserves seemed to indicate a
policy mistake at first blush, the policy of gradual devaluation represented an appropriate
response to the externally driven portfolio investment and capital outflows. According to
Deutsche Bank Research, the chosen policy allowed the Central Bank to ―ensure an orderly
deleveraging of private-sector external debtors without major bankruptcies, [and] avoid massive
deposit runs that could have brought the banking sector under additional serious stress.‖107
Alternatively, the government could have allowed the currency to crash – since most Russian
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institutions, large companies, and the Russian government hold their reserves in dollars and euro,
this policy would have harmed small and medium Russian enterprises and the average citizen.108
The combination of tempered devaluation with continued foreign exchange reserve depletion
indicates a nuanced adaptation of economic goals (gradual lowering of exchange rate and
subsequent rise in domestic prices to accommodate social stability, and safeguarding of financial
positions of important banks and corporations) to crisis realities.
Budget
Commodities prices constitute a key driver of Russian GDP growth in addition to
external, fiscal and monetary developments. The fall of global commodities prices by nearly 75
percent since July 2008 carried significant ramifications for the Russian economy. Crude oil and
gas account for two-thirds of Russian exports, and thus continued increase in export prices over
2003-2008 improved Russia‘s terms-of-trade by more than 120%.109 On October 16, 2008, oil
prices dropped below $70 per barrel, coinciding with a drop in Russian oil production.110 Total
oil exports fell 10 percent year-on-year in October.111 In September 2008, Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister of Finance Alexei Kudrin announced that Russia‘s 2009 budget would enter a
deficit if oil prices sank below $70 per barrel.112 Two months later, Kudrin pronounced
acceptance of a long-term drop in oil prices and that the existing state budget plans will hold
unchanged if the oil prices stabilize on 50 dollars per barrel mark.113 In 2009, the government
increased its expenditures by 33 percent in an anti-crisis stimulus package. Indeed, the federal
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budget entered a deficit that year, its first in a decade; in February 2009 First Deputy Prime
Minister Igor Shuvalov announced plans to limit the deficit by introducing budgetary cuts, a
policy which would serve to protect foreign exchange resources. This policy directly
demonstrates consideration for external events: by turning away from a sustained policy of
increasing public spending, or maintaining the pre-crisis level, the government indicated
awareness that continued low oil prices may cause a prolonged recession, seriously degrading the
cushion of foreign exchange reserves and limiting the scope of future recession-combating
measures. Since this policy is contractionary in nature, it opposes the ambitious growth goals
pursued before the crisis. However, in light of the severe constraints imposed by the global
slowdown in demand for commodities, this is a fiscally responsible response balancing stimulus
and appreciation for the possibility of a sustained global ―rainy day‖ scenario.

Interaction with big business
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The stock market crash, plunging commodities prices and global credit crunch each
contributed to a deterioration of the ability of many Russian state corporations114 and banks to
generate revenues, finance acquisitions and roll over debts (see Chart 3). Struggling companies
such as Lukoil, Rusal and Norilsk Nickel became debtors of the state in 2008 and 2009,
surrendering shares in their companies and board seats as collateral for receipt of loans disbursed
by Vneshekonombank (VEB).115 In September 2008 the Ministry of Finance increased the
number of banks with access to
budget funding from three to
twenty-eight,116 and in February
2009 the state put rehabilitation
of the banking sector, which was
then mired in write-offs from
bad loans to Russian companies,
at the forefront of its agenda in a
shift away from attention to
industry.117 First Deputy Prime
Minister Shuvalov‘s comments
on this shift illustrated a seeming realization within the government that it would have to be
much more selective in disbursing state aid than ever before, especially to businesses with which
it has close ties. Coinciding with changes imposed by the global economic climate, namely the
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downgrading by Fitch Ratings of Russia‘s credit rating based on large-scale capital outflows and
rapid reserve depletion, Shuvalov ―suggested the government might have been wrong‖ to lend
$4.5 billion, its largest bailout loan, to Rusal, and discontinued a $50 billion support fund
intended to assist ―magnates at risk of losing stakes in their companies to margin calls.‖118 Until
recently, small- and medium-sized enterprises were ignored by policymakers, as criteria for
government credit guarantees included annual sales of over 15 billion rubles or half billion
dollars and a workforce of no less than 4,000 employees.119 As the size of state funds themselves
varies with the rate of inflation and volatile oil prices, there is broader uncertainty about the
economic capacity of the state to maintain control over the business community as before. On
one hand, the constraints on federal tax revenues would imply a sobering effect on spending for
support to the private sector and a policy of lending to the firms that would use funds most
efficiently in order to stimulate the economy. Russia‘s tycoons, however, control the companies
that are most closely tied to the state (for example, RusAl, Gazprom, Aeroflot, Rosneft, among
others) and are considered to be the most inefficient and corrupt. Thus, the problem of leading
the country out of crisis and the arrangement of existing state-business relationship imposes new
challenges for maintaining the existing regime and political system. In the next section, more
attention will be devoted to explaining the Economist‘s recent statement that ―The Kremlin is
bailing out the business tycoons it was once expected to curb‖120 from the perspective of both
societal demands and domestic politics.

International cooperation
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As the crisis unfolded, the attitude of the Russian state to international cooperation
evolved from disinterest to desire for leadership and discussion. In October 2008, when Russian
leaders still widely denied the presence of crisis in their country, Kremlin spokesmen
communicated a cool reception of an invitation by the US to hold a summit to discuss the
international crisis. Dmitry Peskov, spokesman for Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, said it was
too early to determine who from Russia would attend, if at all.121 Three months later, in January
2009, Putin urged the development of multiple, regional reserve currencies in addition to the
dollar, noting "excessive dependence on a single reserve currency is dangerous for the global
economy."122 This constituted an altered approach to the nature of the crisis: the blame,
according to Putin, now fell on the system created and mismanaged by the United States, and
Russia offered a solution to the problem. The assertive independence characteristic of the
Kremlin‘s rhetoric during the boom years was replaced by a more conciliatory tone towards the
US, despite potential hostility in late 2008 stemming from failure to agree on Russian accession
to the WTO and US criticism on the invasion of Georgia; Putin wished the Obama team luck and
said he looked forward to cooperating in the future.123
In April 2009 Russian and Chinese leaders signed twelve bilateral agreements on
cooperation in energy and finance, supporting agreement by companies from both nations for
building 205 joint projects in the Russian Far East, Siberia, and northeast China.124 Earlier in the
year, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao had, like Putin, called for tighter regulation of the
international financial system and reserve currencies and blamed the inappropriate
macroeconomic policies of some nations for the crisis. Given China‘s increased importance in
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the international economy, Putin may have attempted to align his country more closely China as
a bet on the future benefits of such an alliance. The central role of the state in managing both
country‘s economies rendered China a more suitable ally at a time when Russia opposed
America‘s economic program and brand of capitalism. Through June 2009, President Medvedev
continued to cautiously promote this position, stating at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum,
―The artificial and monopolar support of a monopoly on key segments of the world economy
became the fundamental cause of the crisis.‖125 On the eve of the Group of 20 Summit in
September 2009, however, calls for new global reserve currencies waned. Presidential aide
Arkady Dvorkovich did not discredit the idea entirely, but offered a timeline of uncertain length
for when such a scenario might arise. Further tempering the Russian government‘s tone, he
reiterated President Medvedev‘s acknowledgement that Russian shortcomings, not simply the
irresponsible actions of the US, had contributed to transmitting crisis to his country.126 By this
point, the negative effects of the crisis had hampered significant parts of the Russian economy
and consumed the state resources; realizing the magnitude of the downturn and the futility of
denying its existence and Russia‘s role in its occurrence, Putin, Medvedev and others took a
pragmatic and active, not victimized or defeatist, approach to the international anti-crisis
dialogue.

Analysis
After process tracing from externally driven disturbances to government responses,
substantial evidence exists that the Russian state responded directly to these instances through
distinct policy measures following an initial period of skepticism regarding the magnitude of
125

Andrew Kramer, ―Medvedev Calls Dollar Unsuitable as a Reserve Currency.‖ The New York Times. June 5,
2009.
126
Steve Gutterman, ―Russia to push for reform at the G20 summit.‖ The Toronto Star. September 17, 2009.
Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2010
Dasha Barannik, College ‗10,

50

influence these forces could exert on the country‘s economy. Massive liquidity injections,
gradual devaluation of the ruble, a revision of the federal budget based on projections of lower
global oil prices, and bailouts to state-supported banks and corporations each demonstrate shifts
in state policies occurring directly as a result of the determination that previous policies were
untenable in the conditions created by the crisis circumstances. Based on the assessment of precrisis policy and the low likelihood that policies outlined above and others in a similar a vein of
reform would be undertaken in the absence of such a cataclysmic event, it is reasonable to
conclude that the state adopted these measures out of a sense of necessity given the economic
environment sprouted in Russia by the crisis. Additionally, the instances of willingness to
cooperate, or at least continue to interact with other nations demonstrates Russian leaders‘ desire
to increase Russia‘s presence in global economic affairs as an extension of its desire not to end
up on the periphery of world politics. China‘s rise on the global stage and its more successful
navigation of the crisis has made it both a threat and an opportune partner for Russia.
Adjustments in Russian foreign policy may be necessary if the country is to avoid
marginalization in the international economy: increasing influence in global processes will likely
require a more conciliatory and less ideological approach to interactions with the United States,
France, and other major powers.
Having traced the impact of external events on Russia‘s macroeconomic indicators,
federal government, big business, and foreign economic relations, the analysis now turns to
consider the consequences of crisis for the majority of Russians. Their experiences differed
widely from that of individuals in large state corporations, but the collective negative impact on
popular sentiment yielded a detectable discontent whose effects on state economic policy must
be examined.
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SOCIAL PRESSURES
Threat of social pressure, defined as popular discontent from average citizens, heightened
between September 2008 and April 2009. While large-scale street protests were unthinkable in
the last five years, several instances of explicit opposition to government policies occurred
during this time, though overall social unrest has been ―isolated and parochial.‖127 The adverse
impact of the crisis in the real economy affected aggregate demand, labor demand and asset
prices: prices rose for staples such groceries, the number of poor increased by roughly 2.7
million people in 2009,128 and unemployment hovered around 13 percent in 2009.129 As is
generally characteristic of the government response to the crisis and ambiguity about future
economic development, Cliff Levy pointed out in February 2009 that ―the authorities remain
unsure whether to address the country's financial troubles with a thaw or a crackdown.‖130 In
December 2008, the Russian government raised tariffs on imported automobiles in an effort to
protect domestic manufacturers. Many citizens of Vladivostok earn their livelihood by importing
used Japanese cars and thus took to the streets in response, asserting that the tariff had devastated
sales of such vehicles and left many families impoverished. Special riot police sent by the
Kremlin from Moscow initiated a bold crackdown more aggressive than any similar response in
recent years.131 As capital continued to flow out of the country and the general economic outlook
deteriorated, state actions in Vladivostok exhibited the heightened sensitivity of the Kremlin to
popular uprisings, most of which occurred in ―monocities‖ – areas whose existence depends
largely on a single firm or industry such as construction, manufacturing or retail trade. According
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to the Institute of Regional Policy (IRP), over 20 percent of the Russian population lives in
roughly 460 such single-industry cities, whose production facilities account for more than 40%
of Russian GDP.132 By sharply reducing the revenue of the companies driving the economies of
monocities and making the attainment of loans nearly impossible, the crisis forced cuts to social
welfare expenditures. Rollbacks such as continuing non-payments of wages, firings, and decline
in the living standards are more salient to ordinary Russians, many of whom are unfamiliar
government actions regarding the exchange rate, support to the financial sector, and the federal
budget, but agitate for welfare spending and pensions. On this dimension, the situation exhibited
similarities to the 2005 pensioners‘ strike: on ―bread and butter‖ issues, broad affected segments
of the population are capable of demonstrating signs of discontent.
A series of economic protests in Pikalevo in June 2009 received national attention as a
result of Vladimir Putin‘s personal visit. In a public address characteristic of the paternalistic,
assertive crisis-management techniques of past Russian leaders, Putin ordered the owners of the
town‘s cement factory to re-open its doors. Keeping the industries of the monocities open,
however, is inefficient. Relics of the Soviet era maintained through federal support, their
products are inferior to imported substitutes, and their operations inefficient and outdated.133
Before the crisis, monocities received relatively little investment and development attention from
the government; by negatively impacting the direct livelihood of their populations, the crisis has
made them epitomes of Russia‘s gravest infrastructure and inefficiency woes and sharply
elevated their importance for Putin and Medvedev. Minister of Economic Development Elvira
Nabiullina stated that the unrest in Pikalevo prompted the decision to appropriate $315 million to
assist two hundred of the most threatened monocities and to more closely monitor their
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problems.134 Putin‘s personal involvement has indeed come on the heels of social unrest,
evidence of vigilance to popular concerns, a populist manner of maintaining political power. The
experiences of 1998 and 2005 demonstrated to Putin that there is a certain value in nipping
nascent social flare ups in the bud early, as they have the potential to evolve into more
destabilizing problems for the state if allowed to fester.
The government response to the social pressures unleashed by the crisis has a dual nature.
On one hand, there have been many highly publicized instances geared towards showcasing the
continued strength of the state, its concern for the welfare of its people, and its ability to mitigate
the negative social effects of the crisis. These include Putin‘s promise of more state aid for the
machine tools and car industries in August 2009 following continued protests of wage cuts at
AvtoVAZ. Two days after an opinion poll revealed that high food prices were the chief concern
of 75 percent of Russians, Putin stormed into a Moscow supermarket and decried the high price
of sausages.135 In its negative pressure on employment, poverty reduction, wages and prices for
staple food and living items, the crisis directly threatened the principal pillar of Putin‘s
legitimacy, the provision of improving living standards and economic stability, in a manner not
seen over the course of Putin‘s eight-year presidency. Between 2008 and 2009 the fact that not
only the politically marginalized expressed vocal protest proved to unsettle federal officials: in
November 2008 Medvedev ―instructed law enforcement agencies to stamp out any unrest and
take action against those seeking to ‗exploit the consequences‘ of the financial crunch.‖136 Yet
the fiscal response to the crisis up to April 2009 primarily targeted banks and firms rather than
households through a lower tax burden and direct support, with a smaller share of total stimulus
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devoted to on-the-job training, temporary work programs, and higher unemployment benefits.137
Furthermore, in November 2009 Putin revealed that the amount devoted to the labor market in
2010 will be less than the 2009 stimulus for similar measures. The announcement, at the end of
an address to the 11th party congress of United Russia, Putin‘s political party, did not figure into
the top policy priorities of modernizing sectors of strategic national importance, improving
Russia‘s high tech industry, stimulating housing and boosting domestic demand.138
On the other hand, limited financial resources implied the government could no longer
shore up AvtoVAZ and others without introducing new considerations of ―how to restructure
local enterprises, bring in new sources of employment or, as a last resort, shut them down.‖139 In
this vein, President Medvedev ordered a probe into the operation of state corporations in August
2009 following a reduction of the working week at AvtoVAZ, which received billions of rubles
in state aid.140 Such moves, however, have yet to result in a notable reformulation of the state‘s
relationship with these major corporations to the benefit of more transparent operations.
Furthermore, measures targeting the elite at times almost directly superseded populist messages:
less than a week after Putin‘s derision of Oleg Deripaska‘s management of the Pikalevo cement
factory, state-controlled Vneshtorgbank extended another credit line to Deripaska.141
Overall, government policy since the start of the crisis through 2009 has shown a
continuation of Putin‘s pre-crisis balancing of oligarchs and other elite interests; the economic
crisis imposed new limitations on the tools which could be used towards this end. Thus far, the
state has managed to preserve its symbiotic relationship with the oligarchs, utilizing some as
scapegoats for the layoffs and wage arrears inflicted on average Russians. As Gregory White and
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Alexander Kolyandr note, "Most likely, the decision on [automobile] import duties was made in
order to help Kremlin favorites like Sergei Chemezov and Oleg Deripaska whose holding
companies own the AvtoVAZ and GAZ carmakers;‖142 the state‘s support of these tycoons and
others shows that the need to demonstrate some degree of control over big business existed
during the acute period of crisis as it did before the crisis, especially since promises of support to
various sectors initially ―appeared to me made as and when those sectors came to the
government looking for help rather than as part of a carefully considered stimulus package.‖143
As the crisis wore on, the fiscal constraints facing the state came into sharper view, and ―the idea
of a ‗rescue list' for oligarchs mooted in the autumn of 2008 was quietly abandoned.‖144 In this
manner, Putin has been able to keep his preferred method of state control over big business while
providing isolated and targeted support to those deemed most worthy – whether based on
political or economic considerations. White and Kolyandr question whether doling out large
stimulus sums to favored enterprises will save the domestic car industry, a concern echoed by
those who believe the crisis response foreshadows a continuation of heavy state interference in
the economy, favoritism towards big business, and a lack of attention towards investment and
development of a competitive and business environment.145
Rising inflation, unemployment and wage arrears, three major factors of importance to the
Russian population, threatened to ignite future opposition to the government economic program.
A study conducted by the All-Russian Public Opinion Research center (VTsIOM) revealed
inflation and growing prices as the main problems seen by Russians as the top threats facing the
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country (61 percent of respondents ranked these problems at their major concerns).146 Inflation
targeting received little attention during the acute phase of crisis, when measures for financial
sector revitalization and gradual devaluation took precedence. According to Deutsche Bank,
official plans to switch to an inflation-targeting framework do exist.147 It seems likely, however,
that ―the Central Bank will continue to pursue exchange rate targets and, simultaneously, aim to
lower inflation,‖148 which will be challenging given the volatility of capital flows exacerbated by
the economic crisis. Rising inflation, however, is largely contingent on rising oil prices; even
without a significant state focus on limiting inflation in 2009, its level declined to 8.8 percent in
December 2009 from 14 percent in March 2009 and may fall lower in 2010,149 a well-established
correlation supported by economic scholarship. Between August 2008 and December 2009, the
critical level of inflation at which social and political unrest sets in, judged to be 15 percent by
many economists,150 did not occur. Overall, though the crisis has prompted a reevaluation of
monetary policy as evidenced by official statements regarding the high inflation rate and interest
rate decisions, this reassessment did not come about rapidly as a result of social disruptions
related to high food prices. These social disruptions, in turn, were minimal as a result of
rebounding oil prices. In the long term, inflation targeting can be achieved through a
commitment to fostering investment and domestic savings – a reform scenario as dictated earlier
in this thesis. It is clear that though crisis has contributed to planting the seeds of a new
willingness to consider these policy options, any structural reforms or coherent, resolute pursuit
of these goals will likely not occur in 2010 if the social impact of the crisis lessens with moderate
global recovery.
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Criticism of the government‘s crisis response and broader economic policy has also come
from a faction of respected Russian economists, former politicians, business leaders and scholars
which has begun to question the fundamental principles of the authoritarian regime, evidence of
the critical nature of the current period for the country‘s future development. In November 2008,
Dr. Evgeny Gontmakher, head of a social policy research centre in the Russian Academy of
Sciences, authored an article explaining how protests could ripple through monocities to ignite a
violent social uprising similar to a notorious Soviet-era eruption.151 Though a senior government
official chastised Gontmakher for his ―extremism,‖ his predictions were also deemed by officials
to be incorporated into crisis management strategy.152 The presence of special forces to quell
unrest in Vladivostok followed this development. In February 2009 the Institute of
Contemporary Development, a Moscow think tank run by Igor Yurgens, a liberal economist and
one of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's closest economic-policy advisers, sharply criticized
the government for its actions in response to the crisis and outlined measures for shedding the
country‘s dependence on commodities exports and a bureaucratic dead weight. In an interview,
Yurgens noted the lack of dialogue and accountability between the state and common Russians
in regard to economic measures. On January 16, 2009, an open letter signed by former Prime
Minister Mikhail Gorbachev, Vladimir Ryzhkov, a liberal former member of parliament, and
Russian billionaire and former government official Alexander Lebedev condemned the
government‘s tight control of politics and crisis management and accused leaders of unfairly
bailing out favored wealthy businessmen at the expense of taxpayers. In March 2009, Boris
Nemtsov, a former vice-premier, and Vladimir Milov, a former energy minister, issued a report
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outlining the failed crisis response policies of the Putin-Medvedev tandem.153 Amidst the
crystallization of perspectives on the major sources of Russia‘s failure and the regime‘s role in
the future of the country, control over television, which is ―completely whitewashed by the
Kremlin's censors‖154 has contributed to maintenance of popular support for the regime and a
lack of coherent reply to the diatribes of liberal critics.
Certain individuals within the government have expressed discontent with the charges
levied by critics; interpretation of these expressions will be carried out as part of the analysis of
domestic politics and actors in the following chapter. It will be necessary to attempt to discern
whether ideological or personal interests of policymakers have dictated actions in recent years,
and thus whether the crisis is an input into the considerations of these individuals, or its own
independent variable exerting significant influence on policy.

DOMESTIC POLITICS
The 2008 economic crisis initiated a new chapter in the struggle for power within the
Russian political establishment. As the single greatest short-term challenge facing the regime
between August 2008 and the end of 2009, the turmoil disrupted the mechanism created by Putin
to maintain a balance of power between two main competing factions in the ruling elite, the
civiliki and the siloviki. In proposing solutions to the economic downtown and addressing the
reform agenda, government officials have demonstrated varying ideologies and approaches to
governance, suggesting the existence of competition for political power among various groups
and individuals. The personal preferences of top economic decision makers, that is, their
ideological leanings, may be viewed as alternative explanatory factors driving the crisis response
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and movements toward economic reform. In this view, officials with liberal mentalities pursue
certain policies despite economic circumstances or considerations regarding personal power.
More broadly, Russia‘s unique domestic political landscape may exert a more critical influence
on economic policy than either the externally imposed constraints on the economy or the
detrimental effects to society. I posit that the government response to the crisis through
December 2009 reflects, at least to some degree, attempts by Putin and his trusted inner circle of
government officials to protect their legitimacy and personal interests while responding
appropriately to the adverse externally imposed and social effects of the crisis. The economic
turmoil ignited various points of disruption that both threatened the existing policies and the
individuals promoting them, and seemingly opened the door for contrarian viewpoints on
economic management to be voiced within the government.
To be certain, as the crisis developed, the problem of how to address it received attention
from the Putin-Medvedev tandem. The actions and messages of the two leaders have at times
opposed one another; in other instances, the attitudes have been consistent. Later, Medvedev
focused on championing the need for eradication of corruption and liberalization of the Russian
political system, whereas Putin continued to assert the value of the state‘s role in supporting
economic affairs. The nature of the ruling duopoly has been a central topic of debate among top
scholars and Russia experts; this thesis assumes that at the start of 2010, Prime Minister Putin
retains a monopoly on the country‘s political resources. Prior to the beginning of the economic
crisis, President Medvedev lacked Putin‘s strong personal charisma and confidence in his
popularity with Russians, as well as an influential inner circle capable of ousting Putin‘s
incumbent allies. Heralded by some as a leader more open to Western-style democracy and one
with a less aggressive style, Medvedev appeared to be a subordinate of Putin, his long-time
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mentor, despite making public declarations of intentions to reform several dimensions of Russian
society. Speculations about the precise terms of the power sharing agreement and the degree to
which Medvedev can influence his own destiny in the regime flourished; yet the Russian
political system remains an enigma. This thesis assumes, however, that Medvedev and several
others do harbor personal desires to liberalize and modernize the Russian economy and have
pursued these goals not opportunistically, but steadily. By challenging the successfulness of the
basic economic policy associated with Putin, the crisis may have bolstered the legitimacy of the
program advocated by members of the liberal-leaning faction. Two questions arise: to what
extent can Putin control the emergence of this group and its principles, that is, has the crisis
limited his ability to ensure his own political survival through suppression of competing
interests, and to what extent does he actually wish to do so, that is, does Putin in fact desire to
maintain the status quo, or does he recognize the need for the power structure to evolve? While
critical junctures such as economic crises may render a country susceptible to political or
economic upheaval, policies are ultimately the choices of individuals. A multitude of questions
surrounds the political dimension of economic policymaking and reform in Russia, most of
which are vastly outside the research parameters of this thesis and which other scholars
acknowledge as generating speculative answers. Instead, I will focus on describing the
ideological inclinations and policy preferences of key leadership factions and economic
policymakers and the instances of various policies that may indicate the influence of certain
groups. Linkages may then be made between proponents of successful policies and shifting
balances of power within the government.
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Putin’s agenda
During his first term, Putin consolidated power by appealing to a wide variety of interest
groups; this period coincided with the introduction of the structural reforms described earlier.
However, in 2003 and 2004, the year of Putin‘s reelection, deinstitutionalization, centralization
and state capitalism came into focus as the chief pursuits of the Putin administration.155By
choosing Mikhail Fradkov as his Prime Minister and reducing German Gref‘s power, Putin
―transformed his reform government into a non-reform government‖156 to allow his closest allies,
the siloviki, to amass power at the expense of reformers. As the executive branch amassed power,
factionalism, personality clashes and bureaucratic maneuvering carried more weight in policy
determination.157 Putin‘s dual goals of macroeconomic stability and high economic growth did
not require reform due to high oil prices and capital inflow from foreign investors attracted to
state-controlled companies‘ high asset values. The stifling of reform also coincided with the
public discontent with Putin in relation to the 2005 attempt at pension reform. Throughout his
second term, Putin words stood at odds with his actions: while espousing the merits of
privatization, he carried out large-scale renationalization of efficient enterprises. Anders Aslund
contends that this effort was driven by ―state officials‘ interest to extend their power and wealth‖
because it was not part of a broader socialist or nationalist ideology, and converted wellfunctioning, ―superior‖ private enterprises into less efficient tools of the state.158
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Siloviki
Putin‘s closest colleagues from his tenure in the Russian security services and the St.
Petersburg government have occupied key positions in the state administration and state-run
companies since 2000; they and others who share common political views and pursue similar
economic interests form the siloviki faction. According to Ian Bremmer and Samuel Charap, the
term is derived from the word silovyestruktury, Russian for ―force structures,‖ a reference to the
―armed services, law enforcement bodies, and intelligence agencies that wield the coercive
power of the state.159 Though not all members of the siloviki clan are current and former
officials from these government agencies, the term is used by Western analysts for familiarity. 160
Leading this group is Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin, who is responsible for Russia‘s energy
sector and also serves as Chairman of Rosneft. Sechin and other government officials and
businessmen, including Russian Railways head Vladimir Yakunin, First Deputy Prime Minister
Sergei Ivanov, Rostekhnologii head Sergei Chemezov, champion the notion of a sovereign and
independent Russia, led by a strong state able to exert influence over a significant portion of the
economy, whose natural resources belong to the Russian people – Ian Bremmer refers to these
preferences as ―statism‖ and ―economic nationalism.‖161The siloviki have shown their intention
to control the country‘s major economic resources, for instance, through Rosneft‘s acquisition of
smaller oil and gas firms, likely motivated by a desire for personal enrichment as well as
continued political influence.162
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Civiliki
Experts have claimed the existence of a faction of so-called liberal reformers in the
Russian governmentsince the early 1990s. This group is linked to President Medvedev‘s political
ascendancy, with many of its members originating in the civil law network in St. Pertersburg.
Western media refers to the civiliki as intellectuals interested in pursuing democratic reforms and
modernizing the country. The term refers to the origins of most members of the clan in the St.
Petersburg civil law agencies.163 Proponents of market economies with transparent and
competitive practices, they seek to shift the focus of economic development to increasing
investment in the country instead of continuing the harvesting of commodities exports revenues
into government funds. First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov, First Deputy Chief of Staff
Vladislav Surkov, Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin, former Minister for Economic Development
German Gref, Chief Economic Advisor to President Medvedev Arkadiy Dvorkovich, and
Economic Development and Trade Minister Elvira Nabuillina have each been associated with the
government‘s liberal faction, albeit with varying degrees. Dvorkovich has stated that, ―The
government cannot replace the private sector, the market, and business, nor is it going to do
so;"164 in February 2010 he authored an article appearing in The Huffington Post encouraging the
Russian state to act ―pragmatically by formulating both a plan of priorities and the basics of
long-term policy‖165 for ―the innovative renewal of the Russian economy.‖ In pursuit of
privatization and structural reforms, the civiliki support the release of state corporations from the
control of siloviki associates, whose management they view as inefficient and corrupt. The
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reinvigoration of a strong business relationship with the West also constitutes a goal of this
group.

Domestic politics during the crisis
A variety of individuals have played key roles in constructing the government anti-crisis
plan since August 2008. In the most acute phase of the crisis, lasting through October 2008,
Putin and Medvedev both met with business leaders to discuss state bailouts for corporations
facing serious liquidity challenges. In November 2008 Putin spoke to a meeting of his political
party, United Russia, introducing stimulus measures and optimistically setting forth the goal of
using the crisis to strengthen the economy.166 In this speech, he underscored his intention to
render the state the dominant provider of credit to institutions in need and thus strengthen its
control via bailouts and liquidity injections. As problems spread to the real economy, however,
Putin made a greater effort to appear in as protector of the Russian people against injustice – an
image he has promoted throughout his political life – appearing, as noted earlier, in supermarkets
and publicly scolding an oligarch. Given the weight macroeconomic stability and the lack of
societal chaos carry in the Putin formula for power, these overtures come as no surprise. Aside
from wide-sweeping remarks about the need for restoration of the pre-crisis economy, Putin
refrained from becoming intimately involved with the formulation of specific anti-crisis
measures. In April 2009 he introduced a 2010 budget that carried a large fiscal deficit, a small
investment budget, and populist measures such as an increase in pensions through direct
payments that deviated from Medvedev‘s ideas regarding innovations.167 Liberal critics lamented
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the lack of attention to the anti-crisis goals of clearing bad loans from the banking system and
addressing inefficiencies in state-supported enterprises.
In December 2008 Putin formed a new Anti-Crisis Commission (formally, the
Governmental Commission on Sustainable Development of the Russian Economy) to handle
both the economic and social dimensions of the crisis. Igor Shuvalov leads on economic and
business issues, while Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Zhukov is in charge of mitigating the
societal impact of the crisis. Acting on Putin‘s orders, the two divisions worked jointly to
monitor the Russian labor market and recommend a list of 1,500 businesses eligible for state aid
and criteria for this aid to the Finance and Economic Development Ministries.168 Both Shuvalov
and Zhukov are considered key Putin allies: the more liberal Shuvalov was Putin's key economic
aide in the Kremlin and Russia's Group of Eight Sherpa and is tasked with ―promot[ing]
economic freedoms and oversee[ing] foreign trade, WTO talks, small business, state property
and anti-monopoly policy,‖169 whereas First Deputy Prime Minister Zhukov retained his current
position from the Medevdev government. Exemplifying one aspect of the state‘s altered
approach to economic policy, in October 2008 Shuvalov, speaking to journalists in what he
promised would be the first in a series of regular state briefings about the financial crisis,
dismissed rumors that the state was embarking on nationalization projects and promised more
transparency from the government in the future.170 He described the state‘s intent in March 2009
to focus on stimulating growth through industries other than commodities instead of waiting for
global oil prices to stabilize, optimistically stating that growth was possible ―even without high
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prices for oil, metals and gas.‖171 In June 2009 he stated that the government ―should behave
very conservatively‖ regarding the federal budget, and should not revise its figures simply
because oil prices had grown to $70 per barrel since reaching record lows in 2008.172 Shuvalov
had relatively little visibility in the Putin presidential administration, not appearing as a top
contender to succeed Putin. One example of his liberal leaning came in 2006, when Shuvalov
declared that state-controlled Rosneft would be "fully privatized" within the three to ten years,
contradicting statements by other officials.173 In 2008, Shuvalov appeared in a prominent
position at the St Petersburg International Economic Forum, assuring foreign investors of his
government‘s intention to secure their property rights and scale back the state‘s involvement in
the economy. In 2009, he chaired a low-level panel at the Forum, while Igor Sechin, associated
with the siloviki faction, assumed center stage.174 Thus, Shuvalov‘s limited presence at the center
of the crisis management scheme seems to indicate a continuation of the balance Putin seeks to
strike between liberals and hardliners. When the circumstance requires the espousal of support
for liberal or free market principles, such as the foreign investor panic in the autumn of 2008,
officials with corresponding track records surface in support of these goals.

Finance Minister Kudrin is widely considered one of the main architects of the Russian
state‘s crisis response. Since the start of the crisis, both Russian and Western media have
commented on his centrality to the crisis as controller of the Stabilization Fund, a position which
has embroiled him in politicking between state factions. Kudrin has publicly disagreed with
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Putin in pre-crisis times: in 2007 he, along with similarly liberal-minded Economic Development
German Gref, opposed Putin‘s proposal to invest energy revenues in the domestic stock market
to prop up stagnating stock prices on the grounds that such a move would fuel inflation and
speculation.175 The Financial Times emphasized Kudrin‘s discontent with state intervention
during the crisis: on the subject of price freezes on basic foods, he stated, ―it sends a wrong
signal to the market.‖176The preservation of a substantial cushion of foreign exchange reserves at
the conclusion of 2009, however, is evidence of a triumph for Kudrin: he resisted pressure from
stakeholders in major state-supported enterprises (mostly siloviki) to spend reserves on financing
the debts of these corporations. Kurdin also faced demands from Vladimir Yakunin, head of
state-operated Russian Railways and a close colleague of Putin, to institute capital exchange
controls to stem capital flight.177The Kudrin-led policy of gradual devaluation, described in the
previous chapter, demonstrates that the government did not simply acquiesce to pressures from
well-connected business elites and government conservatives, instead tempering policy choices
with options put forth by liberals like Kurdin who were not previously at the heart of domestic
politicking. In February 2009, Kudrin spearheaded a reversal in anti-crisis policy in conjunction
with a revision of the 2009 budget to account for falling oil prices: he ended a foreign debt
refinancing program of Vneshekonombank (VEB), arguing that the commercial banks, fuelled
with foreign currency from the government‘s devaluation measures should perform this
function.178 Throughout the crisis, Kudrin has taken cautious positions, being the first
government official to admit mishandling the economy in the pre-crisis period and insisting that
oil price rebounds should not fuel ―excess appetites.‖ A supporter of stronger links with the
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West, in the midst of crisis Kudrin stated, ―for the moment, in this global economy our capital
market is still a weak link…volatility will be felt on our equity markets, in our currency
exchange rate and in our trade balance,‖ augmenting these remarks in a subsequent presentation
in the United States by saying the Russian state is conducting economic planning “based on the
assumption that we must be on guard, facing a long-term siege of negative factors… and expect
a slow upturn coming out of crisis.‖179 Kudrin, who is not affiliated with any political party, also
criticized Putin‘s United Russia for its ineffective approach to economic policy and actions
against competitive elections in Russia, adding he was disinterested in joining the party.180
Notably, Kudrin himself hinted at the dependence of economic and political life on Putin,
remarking, ―only efforts by the government and Putin personally have managed to keep things in
balance.‖181

Yet discord exists even between Kudrin and Medvedev, two politicians frequently
thought to be in the same camp. The issue of altering the dollar‘s role as the dominant reserve
currency of the world indicated one point of disagreement. At a meeting of finance ministers
from the Group of Eight countries in June 2009, Kudrin noted that the architecture and
mechanics of global financial system were unlikely to undergo change in the near future, adding
that Russia would not alter the structure of its reserve funds, given that the dollar was in "good
shape."182 Days later, Medvedev, speaking at Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
summit, took an opposing position, stating that "the incumbent set of reserve currencies and the
U.S. dollar as the main reserve currency has failed to accomplish their function...we will not be
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able to do without new reserve currencies."183 According to www.polit.ru, a website lauded by
independent international policy discussion website openDemocracy as hosting high quality and
unbiased Russian political commentary and daily news, reported Medvedev‘s criticism of a May
2009 statement made by Kudrin predicting that Russia may not enjoy 2000 – 2004 growth rates
for up to fifty years.184 The clearly opposing views demonstrate divergent interests and roles.
Kudrin, described by several political analysts as a technocrat known for avoiding politicking
and focusing on pragmatically addressing economic issues, is not bound by the political liaisons
and obligations to a broader constituency; it has not been his practice to champion Russia‘s
infallibility or special identity on the world stage. Medvedev carries a different responsibility as
president: he must balance special interests and therefore is more likely to make broad-sweeping
or nationalistic statements.
Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Sechin oversees the country‘s energy sector and serves
as Chairman of Rosneft. He is identified in both Western and Russian media as a close associate
of Putin and the leader of the government hard-line faction comprised of former security services
officials supporting state intervention and nationalism. In June 2009 Sechin upheld state
involvement in the country‘s energy sector, asserting that in the future Russian oil and gas firms
can develop fields independently, without production-sharing agreements with foreign
firms.185There is an abundance of speculation that Kudrin, as the creator of the Stabilization
Fund that channeled oil export profits away from siloviki associates in big business, is his chief
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political enemy.186 Substantial conservative criticism surrounding Kudrin‘s handling of the crisis
and devaluation program occurred since August 2008; in February 2009 head of Russian
Railways Vladimir Yakunin blamed Kudrin for not acting sooner to stem the outflow of foreign
currency echoed Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov‘s sentiments that Kudrin‘s policy of mentarism
should be abandoned.187 Such outcries may provide a window of opportunity for Sechin to
launch an attempt to seize power from Kudrin: in February 2009 Aleksander Bastrykin, head of
the investigative committee of the Prosecutor-General‘s office, accused two top Finance Ministry
officials of embezzling $18 million, a move interpreted by several Russia experts to be a Sechinbacked initiative.188The fact that Kudrin remained in office at the end of 2009 proves a good
barometer of the limits to Sechin‘s machinations.

Analysis
As Russia‘s economy contracted between August 2008 and December 2009, the complex
network of patronage and power politics supporting the Putin system of leadership faced new
iterations of the struggle for political resources. As Ian Bremmer wrote in 2008, ―the siloviki are
here to stay,‖189 deeply ingrained at all levels of the complex bureaucratic fabric including the
segments responsible for economic policymaking and reform. In 2002, Lilia Shvetsova, a Senior
Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, identified three criteria that
allowed Putin to pass structural reforms between 2001 and 2003 and are useful in analyzing the
current prospects for reform motivated by individual interests. Shvetsova writes that Putin ―had
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reason to believe that liberalizing the economy would be preferable to the previous status quo
both for the country and for his personal interest in holding on to power,‖ since the removal of
structural barriers to economic progress could be used to capture the endorsement of the
population; he likely calculated that ―he would not lose his power as a result of liberalization;‖
finally, ―Putin had at his disposal enough resources to carry out at least part of his economic
objectives.‖190Robinson agrees that the weak position of he Russian state immediately after the
1998 crisis complicated prospects for reform.191 Additionally, this series of reforms came in the
midst of economic decline, when the Russian populace was weary from a period of instability.
If one considers the situation today, these same conditions for reform do not exist so
clearly. In the early period of his presidency, Putin appeased many societal groups, contributing
to the accumulation of consensus for reform to take hold; I have argued that by 2008 he clearly
aligned himself with a policy of authoritarianism despite allowing the existence of a liberal
faction in the political ring. Thus, liberalization did not appear to be on the horizon for the
country, at least in the short term. Some scholars argue that the particular ruling tandem with
Medvedev was created specifically for the purpose of creating a mechanism by which Putin
could reconfigure power arrangements to guarantee his own interests in an evolving world.192
Additionally, the period of instability and social discontent remained mild between August 2008
and December 2009, owing to a combination of oil price rebounds, political maneuvers and
government policies limiting the negative impact of the crisis. Making the case for a package of
substantial changes to the economy was not a primary focus of the state during this period, and
would be difficult to accomplish given the lack of extensive dissatisfaction with the government
management of the economy and a clear scapegoat or program to rally both elite and popular
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support against. More generally, anti-crisis measures seemed geared towards preserving the
status quo rather than exploiting change.
Several points and conclusions may be derived from the analysis of the impact of the
domestic federal political system on the determination of the crisis response program and the
prospects for reform. First, the system comprises a multitude of actors, each with preferences
that are difficult to definitively categorize into pro- or counter- pre-crisis economic policy. Most
of these actors operate within complex relationship networks that support Putin‘s continued
power. It is impossible to definitively trace and understand who influences which economic
policy, as most decisions are made behind closed doors without media access. Thus, scholars and
analysts of Russia‘s politics largely speculate on the impact of personal interests and ideologies
on the very processes this thesis seeks to analyze. Nevertheless, based on the assumptions made
above, it has been difficult for liberal-minded individuals to break through the stronghold of
Putin-supported individuals favoring state intervention and nationalism, especially as the most
acute adverse effects of the crisis have shown signs of subsiding and pre-crisis policies appear
workable to a ruling elite seeking to maintain its power. If the crisis persisted, previous policies,
for example, tolerance of opaque operations of state-supported corporations and prior levels of
spending on inefficient social programs, would appear increasingly discredited in the eyes of the
ruling elite. I argue that in this case, and over the course of such a condensed time horizon, only
acquiescence by Putin and his closest allies would truly permit a vast liberalization of policies in
line with the ideas of Kudrin, Gref and, to some extent, Medvedev. This is consistent with the
previously described view that change in Russia ultimately occurs from above, not from popular
pressures. Igor Yurgens, head of the liberal Institute of Contemporary Development, succinctly
reduces the future of domestic politics to a single variable: ―The role of Vladimir Putin will be
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what he sees for himself.‖193 Of course, there is likely a tipping point, characterized by political
failure and a favorable concatenation of events, which could motivate change; however, it did
not occur in the period under assessment. That having been said, Putin and other individuals
operate within an evolving system, what some have deemed an ―overmanaged democracy,‖
which depends entirely on ―leadership popularity and the actual capacity, the talent, of the
leadership in actually exercising this manual control of the system in a competent way.‖194
Though this system seems to have held up between August 2008 and December 2009, future
crises may affect it in unpredictable ways.
Nevertheless, it is useful to investigate Russia‘s prior crisis experience to determine how
certain features, including the domestic political landscape, interact to shape the evolution of
economic policy. Based on the relative influence of internal versus external catalysts, state
capacity, and other societal features conclusions regarding the feasibility of certain state policies
in 2010 and beyond may be drawn. A treatment of the lasting impact of the 1998 crisis on the
Russian population, leadership and economy cannot be excluded from this analysis, for it is the
low point many Russians employ as a benchmark of utter economic collapse and political, as
well as social, calamity. Given that Russia spent nearly a decade attempting to shield itself from
another disaster based on its experience in 1998, the fact that the 2008 crisis occurred at what
had been perceived as a high point in economic success and future development demonstrates the
drawbacks of the Putin approach and invites the question of how the years following this crisis
may be used in for the aims of economic development.
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COMPARISON WITH THE 1998 FINANCIAL CRISIS
Russia‘s development in the past three decades has occurred within a cycle of crisis and
stability. The most recent destabilization occurred in 1998 following policy failures and fruitless
reform efforts during the Yeltsin years (1990s); its unfolding reflected mismanagement of the
opening of the country's financial markets to foreign lenders and investors. The country became
vulnerable to the risk of domestic financial difficulties evolving into currency crisis. Indeed,
when major capital outflows began in the summer of 1998, the government devalued the ruble,
leading to unhedged currency exposures, soaring interest rates, and mass bankruptcies. This
interaction of internal and external circumstances in the case of Russia shared features with
economic crises in other emerging markets during the late 1990s.
The financial crisis beginning in August 1998 is widely seen as having reshaped the
country‘s political economy, as well as its relationship with the global economy.195 In its wake,
the state introduced some medium-term structural reforms, including the introduction of a flat tax
rate and alterations to tax collection, as well as market-oriented policies. Nearly ten years later, a
crisis particularly reminiscent of the meltdown in 1998 hit Russia, inviting a comparison of the
origins, nature, and consequences of the two events to shed light on the implications of the 2008
economic crisis on the economic policy agenda of the Russian state today.

Similarities
Western analysts referred to the economic, social and political developments in Russia
between 1995 and 1998 as an example of a successful transition from authoritarianism and a
closed economy to a market-oriented democracy. The country experienced profound changes and
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appeared to be on an upward trajectory before the summer of 1998. Similarly, the eight years
between 2000 and 2008 comprised the most astonishing, fast and geographically-widespread
economic growth in Russia‘s history, characterized by a thriving stock market and a burgeoning
middle class. Commodities exports played a crucial role in the economy prior to the crisis in
1998: oil and gas accounted for almost half of Russia's export revenues and directly for one-fifth
of federal government revenues.196 The share of oil and gas in export receipts had reached 68
percent in the beginning of 2008, and natural resources directly accounted for half of federal
government revenues.197 After the development of rapid growth and asset booms, both cases
experienced ―default, devaluation and despair.‖198

Differences
At the beginning of the twenty-first century Russia expressed a confident geopolitical
stature, motivated in large part by an economy exceedingly more robust than that of the mid1990s. Then, it had already experienced severe economic difficulty following the failed market
reform experiments made by Yeltsin and Gaidar in the 1990s, which impoverished the
population. Though disagreement exists over the culpability of the Russian state itself in
promoting recession, 199 the crisis of 1998 marked the first true instance when Russia was
subjected to negative impacts caused by its interaction in international economic processes. The
resulting meltdown reverberated to the political and social spheres, knocking down the
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―imitation of capitalism‖ 200 that had given rise to an unsustainable division of economic rents
among the state, the private sector, average citizens and a virtual economy. The subsequent void
of a well-defined relationship between the state, the economy and society permitted Putin to
develop his social contract based on a combination of sovereignty and prosperity. Russian and
Western media agree that the economic crisis of 2008 had truly global origins of an
unprecedented magnitude and thus differed significantly from its predecessor.
The 1998 and 2008 crises differ in several respects, including their origins, the sectoral
linkages in existence during their progression, and the sequencing of their spread to various
sectors of the economy. Owing to the growing dominance of natural resources in the economy
since 1998, vulnerability to global commodity prices played a more prominent role in the origins
of the 2008 crisis. According to some estimates, the overall direct share of natural resources and
related sectors in the economy's total value added increased from about 15 percent in 1997 to
about 20 percent in 2007.201 In 1998, the Russian banking system remained immature and mainly
limited in interaction with large institutional actors; credit to the private sector totaled only 9
percent of GDP.202 Bankruptcies in the financial sector, therefore, had limited repercussions in
the real sector (encompassing economic activities related to aggregate demand and aggregate
supply) , which is predominantly influenced by the activities of consumers and industry. The
nascent middle class shouldered the majority of the negative impact of the crisis, a dynamic to
which the government‘s decision to devaluate the ruble contributed since the price of food and
consumer goods rose sharply and this income segment had constituted the majority of consumers
of these goods. The expanded lower class vocalized its discontent with the state and held onto its

200

Ivan Krastev, ―The Rules of Survival.‖ Reading Russia, Volume 20, no. 2. April 2009.
Ibid
202
Ibid
201

Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2010
Dasha Barannik, College ‗10,

77

savings, opting not to put them back into formal banking institutions.203 In 2008, all three
sectors of the economy (real, government and financial) were hit simultaneously, whereas
previously the financial and banking crises were layered on top of existing problems in the real
sector.204 Additionally, Russia‘s financial sector had evolved: in 2007, domestic credit to the
private sector had reached 42 percent of GDP, about one-quarter of which was granted to
consumers. External borrowing became a widespread practice, financing loan-to-deposit ratios of
150 percent.205

Size and power of government
The potency and magnitude of the 2008 crisis revealed coordination problems within the
regime, as the official state position on the economy was reformulated from denial to acceptance;
yet, despite the results of a January 2009 poll conducted by the Levada Center, an independent
think tank, revealing that a majority of Russians doubted their government could effectively
handle the crisis, Putin‘s and Medvedev‘s approval ratings remain well above 65 percent (78
percent in August 2009).206 As indicated in previous chapters of this thesis, the strength of the
post-Communist Russian state rose to its highest level prior to the downturn of 2008,
differentiating the pre-crisis position from that which existed in 1998. The power of the state
appears in two dimensions, ideological and financial. As Andrew Wilson notes, ―the Putin
regime has successfully mythologised 1998 as a crisis of statehood and therefore argues that
preserving hard-won stability is the only way to prevent a reversal through 1998 back to the
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social chaos of the 1990s.‖207 This notion of the necessity of absolute sovereignty rationalizes a
multitude of actions taken by Putin and other officials, for example, the practice of accumulating
foreign exchange surpluses and maintaining prudent federal budgetary surpluses. Practically, this
means the state has more room for fiscal stimulus than it did in 1998, when general government
revenues accounted for only about 27 percent of GDP , with federal revenues accounting for less
than half of this sum (in 2007 the federal budget surplus was 5.5% of GDP).208 Both these
factors, stimulated by lessons learned from the 1998 meltdown regarding the destabilizing effects
of a hungry and impoverished populace, contributed to an emphasis by Putin and Medvedev on
limiting adverse effects of the crisis on the wallets and psyches of Russians.

Reform
In the case of Russia, the effect of crisis on the reform agenda is mixed and therefore
difficult to extrapolate to the 2008-2009 situation. Some scholars argue that post-crisis
stabilization and growth at the end of the 1990s and through the early 2000s were not created ―by
some corrective effect of crisis‖ which taught policymakers explicit lessons on how to manage
economic affairs and stimulated coordinated reform efforts,209 but rather through a piecemeal
approach and factors not tied to policy. Kathryn Stoner-Weiss credits post-1998 recovery to three
factors: an increase in domestic consumer demand due to the low value of the ruble and high cost
of imports, the rise in world oil prices which grew consumer income and made exports
eventually more affordable, and Prime Minister Primakov‘s disciplined fiscal policy.210 Scholars
who apportion a small part of the credit for recovery to the government also cite the development
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of a virtual economy saturated with corruption and a broad reconfiguration of the state‘s
relationship to the economy that Putin exploited and shaped, but never developed into a coherent
economic plan.211 Some reforms in the financial sector and in terms of free markets, trade
integration, and enterprise privatization and restructuring were reversed in the post-crisis
period.212 Other, medium-term initiatives were promoted, including restructuring of the
electricity sector, tax reform, introduction of deposit insurance, and pension reform.213 Based on
the cumulative government response and recovery prospects at the end of 2009, green shoots of
reform have been overshadowed in large part by a temptation for administrative (non-market)
measures, such as state support for the auto industry.

Analysis
Each crisis has shown that Russia is becoming increasingly embedded in the international
economy; the economic situation today has highlighted a new set of challenges for the country.
To what extent are the country‘s difficulties imposed upon it by the dictates of the global system,
and what share of the accountability lies with the policies of the state? The lessons of 1998, as
well as the Putin regime‘s own conceptions of sovereignty and prosperity shape the state‘s
interpretations of this dynamic and its translation into policy. If the fundamental interests of the
regime have been threatened, then Putin will seek to preserve his power and eradicate the sources
of problem. For at least a period of one year the government demonstrated increased
attentiveness to global processes and the country endured a period of instability at the hand of
volatile oil prices, fluctuations in foreign stock markets, and other events. Assuming that the
Russian state always wishes to maintain its power and achieve maximum political and social
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stability, including in the post-1998 period, Putin and Medvedev will each also do so today,
bolstered by the reality that they have the sufficient political capital, popular approval and
financial resources to do so. Of course, the analysis is complicated by the reality that Putin and
Medvedev may in fact be pursuing either complementary or disharmonious goals – the
opaqueness of much of the Russian political mechanism leaves this an open question regularly
debated by top scholars and experts. Additionally, the domestic political landscape in 2008 is
generally characterized by two factions, one largely promoting maintenance of the status quo and
the other supporting reform, whereas post-1998 the power vacuum was not characterized by a
similarly well-defined and supported tension. However, combining the objective of power
maintenance with the presumption that Putin maintains a monopoly over Russia‘s political
resources once again supports the interpretation that the focus has been on responding to the
crisis in a manner that most closely preserves the pre-existing order, instead of one which
genuinely seeks to address systemic challenges exposed by the crisis and which may prove to be
politically destabilizing if addressed.

CONCLUSION
The 2008 economic crisis, together with the ongoing recovery period, represents a critical
juncture in Russia‘s economic, political and social development. The economic turmoil brought
new challenges to the political establishment and initiated a vigorous period of debate and
dialogue surrounding issues including diversification away from dependence on commodities
exports, modernization, the state as an actor in economic affairs, and globalization. The crisis
experience may precede far-reaching alterations in the relationship of the state to the economy or
to its people, or, conversely, might be viewed in hindsight as a missed window of opportunity
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ushering in stagnation or a reversal in fortune. This thesis determined that the 2008 economic
crisis acted as an independent variable through several channels to considerably influence the
economic policy of the Russian state. By damaging stock markets, federal budgets, and foreign
exchange reserves, the crisis rendered the previous approach to economic management untenable
given Russia‘s existing institutions and resources. As a result of its impact on wages and
unemployment, exacerbated by limited government financial resources, the crisis ignited
demands for greater welfare support to Russian citizens, in turn inciting a variety of populist
measures aimed at assuaging these tensions. Confronting a multitude of negative implications of
crisis, the Russian state faced policy constraints on many dimensions between August 2008 and
December 2009. In the period examined, the dedicated responses to conditions created by crisis
were not treated in a coherent fashion by the state; statements on the importance of further
reform and on cooperation with other countries clashed with attempts to preserve existing power
structures and control over big business.
The crisis laid bare significant weaknesses in the country‘s approach to economic
development and its role in politics and society. A heavy reliance on commodities exports for
sustaining rapid GDP and income growth paired with vastly insufficient investment into
alleviation of the country‘s biggest hurdles to economic growth (investment climate, education,
health, rule of law) represent the two major pillars of the Putin-led system in place prior to the
crisis; in 2010, they remain largely intact. The provision of strong macroeconomic growth during
an era of high oil prices and a favorable global economic environment served as an essential
element in Putin‘s social contract with the Russian population and, by extension, in his formula
for retaining political power. The 2008 crisis, global in nature and external in origin, introduced
disruptions to the equation that must be addressed by Russia‘s chief decision maker in order to
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support his personal interests. Though this thesis has not ventured into the realm of predicting
which scenario will occur, broadly speaking two options appear possible: either Putin will retain
the main features of existing state controls in the economy and authoritarianism (referred to by
others as ―illiberal internationalism‖ and an ―overmanaged democracy‖), attempting to tweak it
on the margins to endure the strains placed upon it by the crisis, or he will permit a dismantling
of the system in favor of one more transparent and open to the global economy. The latter option
would require reform across a number of dimensions, including technological know-how,
enforcement of property rights, and privatization.
In the first section of analysis, this thesis demonstrated that the Russian state directly
responded to external events occurring as part of the global crisis; most, if not all, of these
policies would not have been pursued in the absence of catalysts like those imposed by the crisis,
since they did not promote Putin‘s objectives of maintaining political power and stability.
Massive liquidity injections, gradual devaluation of the ruble, a revision of the federal budget
based on projections of lower global oil prices, and bailouts to state-supported banks and
corporations are all examples of measures taken directly in response to these aspects of the crisis.
The analysis found that as time progressed and the length of the downturn and global oil prices
became more uncertain, state actions incorporated the global recovery to a greater degree; for
instance, substantial changes to the federal budget and anti-crisis policy appeared only after
months of very low economic indicators. On the whole, however, the state lacked a coherent,
well-defined anti-crisis and future development plan.
This thesis concludes that the absence of such a plan and the ad hoc nature of the
government response reflect wider problems endemic to Russia: while global recovery may
alleviate the sharpest economic pains currently facing the country, it will not itself solve the
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fundamental challenges impeding Russia‘s development. Weak institutions for investment, the
lack of programs aimed at igniting engines of economic growth outside the commodities sector,
and an oversized and inefficient state sector constitute three paramount challenges confronting
the Russian leadership. This thesis found no support for the notion that Russian economic crises
necessarily spur reform; indeed the analysis strengthens the notion that the government may be
seeking to construct piecemeal anti-crisis measures while resisting the need for broader structural
reform. Modernization has become the dominant buzzword in the Russian public discourse:
Medvedev has championed the need to diversify the economy, boost technological innovation
and develop the private sector, yet the process of doing so remains a subject of debate. The
issues Russia is facing lie at the heart of development studies: what is the proper sequencing of
such reforms, and to what degree should the state guide them? Tight state control, used in the
Chinese model, can arguably lead to a modern free market economy as well as a democratic,
private sector-led approach.
Questions remain regarding the need for Russia to attain democratization in advance of
modernization, and the willingness of the state to permit this development. This thesis touched
on these issues, revealing that the threat of growing popular discontent motivated a state policy
of a dual nature: highly publicized instances showcasing a populist-friendly side of the state and
its ability to protect Russian from the crisis progressed in tandem with the continuation of Putin‘s
pre-crisis balancing of oligarchs and other elite interests through financial support. The economic
crisis, then, may be understood as imposing constraints on the ease with which Putin and others
could do so, particularly since demands for state support increased as corporations and banks
faced trouble rolling over debts denominated in foreign currency. The uprising of Pikalevo
serves as the most illustrative example of the state‘s increasing alertness to sources of potential
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social disruption, a consciousness likely stemming from a lack of experience with similar
incidences in the past eight years. Nevertheless, between August 2008 and December 2009 Putin
retained his preferred method of state control over big business while providing isolated and
targeted support to those deemed most worthy. Given the necessity of institutional and economic
reforms, Putin‘s case-by-case approach to local problems and bailouts (at least in the earlier
stages of crisis) indicates a postponement of a decision on how to approach the long-term
obstacles. This makes sense, since increasing transparency and the potency of democratic
processes underpins or supports a majority of the reform agenda and thereby inherently loosens
Putin‘s grasp on power. Delays in addressing the root causes of the crisis‘ severe impact on
Russia may lead to the growth of social problems, reversing the political apathy of Russians and
increasing the sense of threat felt by the regime. Future developments will contribute to research
seeking to describe the thresholds beyond which popular discontent forms into coherent political
opposition, a dynamic that has not yet crystallized to incite upheaval of the Russian leadership.
At the present moment, Russians appear to back the state and attribute the detrimental impacts of
the crisis on exogenous forces. Later on, however, if the public determines policy errors or lack
of reform to have caused crisis, there is a chance that the state will pursue vastly different, and
likely more liberal, growth policies as a result.
The analysis confirmed the continued importance of individuals and political networks in
the formulation of economic policy. The economic crisis threatened the legitimacy of Putin and
his inner circle as the mechanism supported by this group permitted the transmission of the crisis
to Russia. Conversely, a more realistic opportunity emerged for liberals to advance their agenda.
Yet by the end of 2009 these interests had failed to materialize into notable policy changes as the
ruling elite has been successful in staving off severe recession, due to a combination of prudent
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fiscal management and accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, appropriate short-term
responses to the crisis, and the barely perceptible prospects of growth on the horizon at the end
of 2009. This confluence of events made pre-crisis policies, as well as the measures taken during
the crisis, most of which did not differ substantially from the pre-crisis state, appear workable to
a ruling elite seeking to maintain its power. Masha Lipman, a political analyst at the Carnegie
Moscow Center, notes that any necessary economic reforms imply ―relinquishing power and
reducing the role of the state‖ which would ―undermine the position of the current decision
makers. So the preservation of the status quo is higher on their list of priorities than making
Russia a more prosperous economy.‖214 This suggests that to the Russian state, the current period
represents simply a new iteration of the previous economic environment – one in which the
tantamount goal of preserving the power of the ruling elite is achieved with new mechanisms.
Without true political competition, the goal of modernization may not be achieved without
wasted resources.
Memories of the 1998 financial crisis in Russia reentered the public and state
consciousness and influenced economic policy decisions during the 2008 crisis. Beginning in
2000, at the start of Putin‘s presidency, lessons from the chaotic and impoverished 1990s and a
desire to avoid recession like the one in 1999 motivated Putin to prioritize the avoidance of
federal budget deficits and the pursuit of some structural reforms in the first half of his tenure as
president. Yet despite his emphasis on financial sovereignty and a strong state, Putin‘s
mechanism for ruling the economy and the country proved ineffective in preventing a
devastating crisis in 2008. This thesis compared the origins, nature and impact of the two crises
to find that in many respects, Russia‘s condition between August 2008 and December 2009 was
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not all that different from the post-1998 scenario. Putin‘s brand of authoritarianism neglected the
same maladies that held back the country earlier; today, however, the global nature of crisis has
led some to predict a far more challenging recovery. In contrast to the frequent turnover of
Prime Ministers and glimmers of democracy under Boris Yeltsin, Putin enjoys high approval
ratings and an unprecedented degree of centralized control over the political resources of the
country. The modest rollbacks of democracy correlated with the achievement of financial and
political sovereignty and high growth rates accumulated to yield a high degree of
authoritarianism that has allowed Putin the latitude to contemplate an approach to future
economic development without putting forth a concrete plan. Yet with time the connections
between the severity of the crisis in Russia to the corruption, absence of property rights and rule
of law, and infrastructure deterioration may become more evident to a larger number of
Russians, prompting them to voice their discontent on a large scale and making avoidance of
these issues impossible for the state.
Authoritarianism and the high degree of state involvement in economic affairs were
merely correlated with the high growth rates of the past decade; indeed, there is no conclusive
evidence that authoritarian states automatically deliver this success or can sustain it in the long
run. Yet the critical juncture at which this claim is tested may be just beginning for Russia:
today‘s public discourse and small sparks of social discontent may precede a more substantial
reevaluation of the social contract and development track. In early 2010 the Institute of
Contemporary Development (INSOR), a think tank created by Medvedev for consultation on
economic policy and modernization, released a report entitled "21st Century Russia: the Image
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of the Tomorrow We Want" which advances the view that Russia is at a crossroads in its history
confronting a choice between modernization or an demotion of its status on the world stage.215
To what extent are the process and components of modernization dictated by the realities
of contemporary global economic integration? At a basic level, this thesis has shown how
external factors fuelling the 2008 economic crisis constrained the policy choices of the Russian
state, forcing alterations of financial and social measures to accommodate the alterations
resulting in the domestic economy. The state was unable to maintain previous levels of financial
resources and security, leading to revisions in how funds were allocated among societal groups.
The tradeoff of remaining linked to international financial markets and the wider global economy
were thus increasing humility and conservatism in economic policy (the revision of the federal
budget, heightened dialogue on cleaning up and strengthening the financial sector) and an
increase in measures aimed at addressing the cost of global economic integration to social
welfare.
As economists have noted for over a decade, extensive willingness by states to participate
in a system characterized by highly volatile international capital flows defines the present-day
international economy. Despite the severe costs capital flight has imposed in all major financial
crises since the 1970s, states have not yet abandoned the current architecture, though the 2008
crisis may prompt a reinvention in future years. Thus, if the Kremlin wishes to continue to reap
the benefits foreign investment can bring, it must formulate a sustainable arrangement addressing
both the social welfare needs of its population and the requirements for successful existence in
the global economy. As this thesis demonstrated, many of these requirements relate to Russia‘s
institutional framework, whose deficiencies permitted domestic transmission of the crisis. If
215
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nothing else, the crisis has posed a stark challenge to Putin‘s system of delivering prosperity and
ensuring sovereignty, prompting a reexamination of some of its basic tenets. Predicting what this
reexamination, which is occurring internal to the Russian state, will yield was not a subject of
this thesis. There are several potential models for economic development, each carrying its own
merits and drawbacks. On the dimension of interaction with other states, there are two options.
The first is a movement towards international cooperation to revise the global financial and
economic framework, which may be termed mutual insurance against the inherent instability of
the global system. Self-insurance, that is, attempting to build resilience to volatility through
accumulation of foreign currency reserves, regulation, protectionism, or other measures, is the
second option. Putin attempted to develop the Russian economy by the latter approach until
2008. The evolution of the Russian state‘s attitude towards multilateral discussions on global
recovery between August 2008 and the end of 2009 indicates an awareness of the need to alter
the aggressive geopolitical stance of the recent past. Putin and Medvedev certainly continue to
seek a way of elevating Russia‘s stature and power on the world stage, but the ruinous effects of
the crisis have significantly discredited their brand of economic management. Attempts to lead
discussions on the international monetary regime have been balanced by a stated desire to
cooperate with other nations. Thus, regardless of whether the country will pursue an evolution of
the status quo or attempt to deeply root modernization, sole reliance on global commodities
prices as before is no longer viable option for the long term.
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APPENDIX A: Russian economic boom, 1999 – 2008
GDP growth (percent year on year), 2000 – 2008

GDP growth in current US dollars, 1999 – 2008
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Source: http://russiablog.com
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